This text presents court decisions, administrative documents, European and Russian sources, economic data, ongoing litigation, and ignored precedents.
It systematically and impartially compiles all possible avenues for understanding the persistence of legal actions by the Russian ship Shtandart, MMSI 518999255. Each avenue is examined with the same rigor, without hierarchy or imposed conclusion. It constitutes a unique analytical database, based on factual and documented elements, some of which have never been published or covered by any French media.
⚠️ Methodological Notes
All lines of inquiry are addressed in this document. It considers the interests of lawyers, psychological factors, practices linked to weak rule of law, and so-called “Russian krysha” logics. It also questions the choice of France as a target and the potential role of Vladimir Martus in a destabilization strategy. These avenues are presented as hypotheses; the collective does not favor any and does not claim that any of them are definitively true.
No Shtandart in Europe relies exclusively on verifiable primary sources and does not aim to express opinions or draw definitive conclusions about the personal or strategic motivations of the Russian ship’s captain. Nevertheless, due to the apparent extreme irrationality of these legal actions, the collective seeks to open a discussion, welcoming participation and critical analysis from all readers.
PART I
Objective Assessment: Legally and Economically Irrational Legal Actions
PART II
Hypotheses Related to the Personality and Reference Frame of Vladimir Martus
PART III
Geopolitical and Informational Hypotheses
PART IV
Open Lines of Inquiry and Analytical Closure
CONCLUSION
PART I
Objective Assessment: Legally and Economically Irrational Legal Actions
I.1. Factual and Legal Foundation (Premises)
a) Judicial Precedents
All decisions resulting from previous proceedings were unfavorable to the plaintiffs.
b) Plaintiffs
These two new legal proceedings, like the previous ones, are brought on behalf of three actors:
- Vladimir Martus, Russian citizen, captain, and de facto owner of the Shtandart
- Martus TV GmbH, a commercial company of Vladimir Martus, managing the ship
- Mariia Martus, daughter of Vladimir Martus, official owner of the Shtandart, holding a Finnish passport
c) New Actions Filed
Le Télégramme, November 25, 2025: “…the ban on access to all European ports was confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in an order issued on August 22, 2025. This is the latest legal decision following similar rulings by the Administrative Court of Rennes and the Council of State in 2024. The Shtandart’s lawyer, Maître Thierry Clerc, stated that an appeal has been filed against the EU court order… and that a substantive annulment procedure is still pending before the Administrative Court of Rennes.” Source
I.2. Proven Legal Ineffectiveness
a) Appeal to the Administrative Court of Rennes
This concerns a reply brief introducing a challenge to Order No. 2403878 of July 11, 2024, which validated the Prefectoral Decree of Finistère prohibiting the Shtandart from accessing the department’s ports.
The reply brief filed on October 4, 2024, belongs to a separate substantive proceeding. It is formally admissible but no longer has real legal effect given the decisions already rendered.
The document is available online:
-> Me Enard-Bazire, Me Thierry Clerc, “Administrative Court of Rennes Annotated Reply Brief”, October 4, 2024.
It contains factual errors. The arguments are confusing, general and repetitive. They were already used in previous attempts to contest the legality of the prefectural decision. Since the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has already validated the positions of the No Shtandart in Europe collective, this brief cannot reverse the course of decisions or annul the decree.
The Shtandart’s legal position remains unchanged. The Russian ship is still subject to sanctions and prefectural decrees.
b) Appeal before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
Vessels subject to sanctions are defined in paragraph 3(a) of Article 3ea of EU Regulation No. 833/2014. The original text stated:“Any ship falling under the relevant maritime conventions.” Article 4ha of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Decision No. 2024/1744 of June 24, 2024, added a clarification specifying “including replicas of historic ships.”
The Shtandart’s first appeal to the CJEU sought the annulment of this amendment. The Court dismissed the complaint, specifying that the Shtandart has been within the scope of port sanctions since April 16, 2022.
The second appeal of the Shtandart, Case AC-686/25, under discussion here, challenges this “interpretation.” Once again, it might attempt to demonstrate that the Russian ship is not subject to sanctions due to:
- its new flag of convenience, Cook Islands, since June 6, 2024
- its mode of construction
- its allegedly “associative” nature (not justified)
- its management by a (Russian) company based in Germany
- its (questionable) status as a “training ship”
- its new nominal owner, since spring 2024, a Russian citizen holding a Finnish passport
- its “cultural” and “heritage” significance
Even if admitted, the action has extremely low chances of success. The previous decision confirmed the arguments of the No Shtandart in Europe collective.
The appeal has no suspensive effect on existing sanctions or prefectural decrees. It has no real impact on the legality of actions against the ship.
c) Ineffective Appeals and Paradoxical Persistence
These two procedures share several characteristics:
- They do not suspend any measures
- They do not open any new legal avenues
- They take place within the framework of the Shtandart’s complete European isolation
I.3. Economic and Operational Irrationality
a) Financial Impact on the Shtandart and Its Supporters
Regardless of their limited legal value, these appeals generate significant costs for the Shtandart and its supporters. Between lawyer fees, filing briefs, and CJEU proceedings, each action consumes substantial resources. However, the ship has reported a lack of liquidity, as noted in the Russian press:
-> RIA Novosti, “Фрегату « Штандарт » не хватает средств на ремонт” (The frigate Shtandart lacks funds for repairs), October 17, 2024
Vladimir Martus has launched fundraising campaigns on the ship’s website and social media.
->Shtandart.eu, “Support the Shtandart ship”
The recipient entity, Martus TV GmbH, is presented as a non-profit association, but is in fact a commercial company based at a P.O. box in Hamburg. It is owned, controlled, and directed by the captain and de facto owner of the Shtandart. It is useful to know that the Shtandart shares a number of practices common to other Russian ships. These are currently the subject of intense scrutiny by Western countries.
-> No Shtandart in Europe, ‘Why is the sanctioned ship Shtandart part of Russia’s shadow fleet?’ 25 July 2025
Rather than changing the legal situation, such appeals appear to exhaust the Shtandart’s resources. They demonstrate the impossibility for Martus to sustainably support – by himself – a costly legal strategy on his own, while maintaining the appearance of continuous action.
b) Operational Deadlock
According to Vladimir Martus, performances at maritime festivals are normally the Shtandart’s primary source of funding. Participation in such events has become impossible in Europe, including France. The only exception in 2025 was the Semaine du Golfe in Morbihan, from May 26 to June 1.
-> No Shtandart in Europe, “What Can Be Concluded from the Russian Frigate Shtandart’s Participation in the 2025 Semaine du Golfe?” December 13, 2025
A supplementary activity remains: taking on paying passengers, called “trainees.” However, boarding and disembarkation opportunities have sharply decreased, creating high uncertainty and even cancellations. The program has become unattractive. In August and part of September 2025, at the peak season, the Shtandart remained docked in La Rochelle or anchored leeward of Île d’Aix.
Conversely, in autumn 2025, in Turkey, the Russian frigate participated in a film shoot and successive cruises. One report noted 37 people on board, crew and/or passengers, far exceeding the Shtandart’s usual complement in the Charente-Maritime waterways. It therefore seems logical for the ship to remain in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Consequently, the appeals and the stated objective of maintaining a presence in French ports are difficult to justify on public economic grounds.
I.4. Minimal Explanatory Hypothesis
The main beneficiaries of maintaining these appeals are Maître Thierry Clerc and the other lawyers of the Shtandart. Each procedure generates fees and requires further steps, giving them a direct financial interest. One cannot exclude that they may have excessively optimistically promised Vladimir Martus a hypothetical success to convince him to pursue legally weak and costly appeals.
This dynamic suggests that Vladimir Martus may not always act independently. It is possible that his appeals are partlyinstrumentalized by his lawyers. Meanwhile, the Shtandart’s captain must recognize that his legal advisors’ interventions have affected him financially and tactically.
By challenging the Prefect of Finistère’s decree and losing the summary proceeding on July 11, 2024, Maître Thierry Clerc generated a jurisprudence that directly or indirectly led to prefectural decrees in Côtes d’Armor, Ille-et-Vilaine, and Manche, where the Shtandart previously docked regularly.
It would have been more advantageous for the Russian ship to discreetly accept the Finistère ban, enabling easier continuation of its activities where opportunities to circumvent EU regulations still existed.
Instead of acting with restraint, Vladimir Martus attempted to force entry into the Brest harbor on July 11, 2024, but was blocked by a Navy patrol vessel. He conducted a media campaign denouncing the prefect’s decision during the Brest maritime festivital in 2024 and held a meeting before a large audience, denouncing “European injustice” and France’s submission to Brussels. Several media outlets reported on the event.
-> Ouest-France, “An Unjust Decision by Europe! In Brest, the banned Russian ship’s captain strikes back”, July 17, 2025
The summary proceeding was a legally counterproductive initiative by the Shtandart’s legal counsel. However, the ship’s captain contributed to its negative impact by ensuring wide publicity. It could no longer be ignored by public opinion or state representatives.
In any case, it is unlikely that the Shtandart’s lawyers were the sole decision-makers regarding these proceedings. Vladimir Martus’ personality is probably another triggering factor.
PART II
Hypotheses Related to the Personality and Reference Frame of Vladimir Martus
II.1. Psychological Dimension of Stubbornness
Beyond legal and financial aspects, Vladimir Martus’ stubbornness could be explained by a psychological dimension. His persistence in pursuing already-lost legal actions seems to stem from several mechanisms:
- personal pride and protection of his image,
- persistence in the face of investments already made (sunk cost bias),
- a need for control and pressure on the authorities and the collective,
- as well as a cognitive rigidity that makes accepting defeat difficult.
Vladimir Martus’ mindset and his relationship with authorities can be understood through his statements on August 18, 2024, on the Shandart Project Facebook page. He was referring to directives from the Maritime Prefect, Commander-in-Chief for the Atlantic.
Shandart Project, August 18, 2024: “Restrictions for port entry from Maritime administration is (sic) still in force. Sometimes it become (sic) even more ridiculous, see copies of their mails below.” Source
It is also worth recalling the course of his conflict with Dmitry Atlashkin, inspector for northern waters transport in Russia. Vladimir Martus infractions, errors, and already his stubbornness had led him to flee Russian ports and waters in 2009. Almost ten years later, he stated:
Zhizn’ mechty, 2018: “I managed to get us registered in the river registry. And they even gave us permission to go to Vyborg. Now I understand that it was a great gesture, but I did not appreciate it at its true value… I think today I would behave with more flexibility and diplomacy in many areas. But then I was young, sexy.” Source
For more information on Vladimir Martus’ history, one can refer to a collection of Russian documents:
-> No Shtandart in Europe, “Bibliography of Vladimir Martus, Russian texts”, 2007 to 2023.
Although it may seem surprising, Vladimir Martus’ personality is a parameter that must be considered in a case involving the French state, the European Union, and a representative of Russian imperial culture.
This psychological reading would be one element that helps explain why, despite legal certainty and the high cost of proceedings, Martus continues to engage in dilatory actions. It can be seen as both procedural harassment and a manifestation of deep personal motivations. It is also important to understand the framework that shaped the Russian captain.
II.2. Gap in Legal Socialization
One hypothesis deserves examination: the profound gap between the frame of reference in which Vladimir Martus reasons and that of an actor socialized in a European rule-of-law state.
Faced with now consistent and stabilized judicial decisions, a French or European actor would very likely have abandoned non-suspensive, costly litigation with no credible legal perspective.
However, the behavior observed in the Shtandart case runs counter to this rationality. It suggests another logic, in which law is not necessarily perceived as a mechanism to resolve a dispute, but as one tool among others in a broader power relationship—symbolic, political, or informational.
This difference can be explained by distinct modes of legal and political socialization, notably marked by:
- a different relationship to judicial decisions,
- another perception of the notion of defeat,
- a possible valorization of persistence in confrontation.
The particularity of the Russian system is presented in an article by Isabelle Mandraud. Her document may offer new keys for explanation.
-> Le Monde, “In Russia, the Rule of Law in Question”, June 17, 2019
This is not about passing value judgment or drawing definitive conclusions, but about noting that this misunderstanding between two normative spheres can contribute to explaining the observed procedural relentlessness.
In a context of weakness or absence of the rule of law, the Russian citizen must, moreover, obtain protection whenever he or his activity goes beyond the ordinary sphere. This protection, called “krysha”, is an essential parameter.
II.3. Logic of “Krysha” and Collapse of the Protection System
Vladimir Martus’ behavior can also be explained by the origin of his political culture. In this environment, appeals and procedures are often used as instruments of pressure or negotiation, rather than as impartial means to assert one’s rights.
In Russia, the political-administrative system often operates according to the logic of the krysha rather than strict compliance with the law.
- Krysha (Russian “roof”): an informal protection system based on networks of influence, aiming to circumvent or instrumentalize the law.
Krysha is not a deviation. It stems from the absence of the rule of law in Russia and is a reflex for those who have never learned to submit to an impersonal rule. Within this framework, Vladimir Martus’ behavior—circumventions, alternative narratives, interpositions, frontmen, and recourse to a shell structure—is not a mere individual strategy. It refers to a cultural and political pattern well documented in the press: the substitution of law by protection.
This approach, transplanted into another space, illustrates the incompatibility between his way of reasoning and the principles of litigation in a rule-of-law state.
It should be noted, however, that unlike other European countries, this method produced concrete effects in France for more than two years. The Shtandart obtained numerous protections against the application of the EU regulation from several agencies, including:
- the Directorate General for Maritime Affairs, Fisheries and Aquaculture (DGAMPA),
- the National Directorate for Intelligence and Customs Investigations (DNRED),
- the General Secretariat for the Sea (SGMer),
- the marina authority of La Rochelle,
- the Charente-Maritime Prefecture…
On this subject, one can read in Le Parisien of November 30, 2025, a statement contrary to the actual applicable law: “Thierry Clerc (lawyer) states that appeals are ongoing and that the ship is still welcome at the port of La Rochelle.”
Primary sources relating to Vladimir Martus’ “krysha” in France are available in a collective publication:
-> No Shtandart in Europe, “French Authorities and the Special Privileges of the Russian Ship Shtandart”, May 15, 2025.
These repeated, exceptional treatments, accompanied by legally unfounded communication regarding restrictive measures from the executive, were reported to the Commission. The 27 Member States of the European Council reprimanded France via CFSP Decision No. 2024/1744 of June 24, 2024. This led to the first unsuccessful referral of the Shtandart to the CJEU, as presented above.
The collapse of his French “krysha” since this decision is likely a source of frustration for Vladimir Martus and could push him toward conflict radicalization. This is the same reaction he had in 2007/2009 during his security dispute with Inspector Dmitry Atlashkin.
As we have seen, it is partially possible to explain the triggering of legal actions by Vladimir Martus’ personality, history, and societal reference frame, as well as by the interests of his legal counsel. Nevertheless, this case cannot be considered independently of the current geopolitical context and the tensions between the Russian Federation and Western countries.
It is necessary to consider it in light of the ship’s links with the regime of its country of origin. This approach leads us to propose additional hypotheses.
PART III
Geopolitical and Informational Hypotheses
The case of the Shtandart fits into a broader dimension than mere administrative litigation.
From July 14, 2024, the collective and its spokesperson were publicly named by RIA Novosti, a Russian news agency, in a narrative hostile to European sanctions.
-> RIA Novosti, “Фрегат « Штандарт » стал мишенью проукраинских активистов в ЕС” (The frigate “Shtandart” targeted by pro-Ukrainian activists in the EU), July 14, 2024.
Since then, several Russian media outlets have relayed a convergent reading of the case. For them, Vladimir Martus is portrayed as a symbol of resistance to sanctions. Such a presentation reinforces his engagement. At the same time, it serves the regime’s propaganda, giving him legitimacy and visibility while reinforcing the perception of a weak, even ineffective, European opposition to Russian maneuvers.
-> Komsomolskaïa Pravda, “Российский парусник «Штандарт» сделает третью попытку нарушить европейские санкции” (Russian sailing ship Shtandart to make third attempt to break European sanctions), August 6, 2024.
This convergence between:
- European judicial proceedings doomed to fail,
- their relay by Russian media,
- and a recurring narrative of victimization,
raises the hypothesis of informational instrumentalization, without it being possible at this stage to infer intent or command.
See also the hundreds of Russian articles on the Shtandart case since July 2024:
-> No Shtandart in Europe, “The Shtandart, propaganda organs and Russian media”,2024/2025.
It is important to emphasize that this is not a matter of “co-opting” Vladimir Martus against his will by regime propaganda. It is indeed a deliberate choice by him, as shown by his “interview” videos addressed to Russian news agencies.
Thus, the Shtandart moves beyond usual considerations, as we have detailed:
-> Diploweb, “Russia. From Soft Power to Hybrid War. Case Study of Russian Influence in Europe: The Shtandart”, November 25, 2025.
III.2. France as a Privileged Ground
One point deserves emphasis: France is the only country subject to litigation by Vladimir Martus, even though it has been and still is the most accommodating state toward the Shtandart.
For the year 2025 alone, in this context of general ban, the Russian frigate docked in Vendée and Morbihan. It also stayed frequently and for extended periods in La Rochelle (Charente-Maritime).
In this regard, in the so-called “Atlantic Kaliningrad”, the prefecture clearly stated that it did not intend to comply with the order issued on August 22, 2025, by the CJEU. To justify its position, it artificially opposes European regulation to maritime law, omitting to consider that the SOLAS convention (Safety of Life at Sea) is taken into account in paragraph 4 of the sanctions applied to the Shtandart.
Sud-Ouest, September 17, 2025: “Above European law applies international maritime law. The latter indicates that in case of technical need or unfavorable weather, vessels must be able to call at nearby ports. Any port is thus obliged to host the Shtandart if necessary,” reports the chief of staff. Source
La Rochelle constitutes a specific case in Europe. It would justify particular interest from the competent state services. The details have been made public:
-> Desk-Russie: “When the Russian ship Shtandart and La Rochelle defy European sanctions”, September 28, 2025.
Recently, the collective once again reported to the Commission the repeated circumventions of European regulations occurring in the maritime city:
-> No Shtandart in Europe, “Request for European Commission intervention regarding non-compliance with port sanctions in France (Morbihan and Charente-Maritime)”, December 17, 2025.
The ship is banned from all European ports, whether in the EU or not. The failure of the 2025 summer tour demonstrated the strict application of restrictive measures. Planned dockings in Ireland, the UK, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal had to be canceled. For the last two countries, the Shtandart is also banned from their territorial waters. Five crew members or clients of the Shtandart were, moreover, arrested by Portuguese law enforcement in September 2025. However, no legal proceedings were initiated against any of these states.
This asymmetry suggests a strategic selection of France as a battleground for several reasons:
- French authorities long sought accommodations or even tolerated circumvention practices, leaving a legally exploitable space.
- Confidential privileges previously granted to the Shtandart were shared by Vladimir Martus and Thierry Clerc to exert pressure on French authorities, who found themselves in a legally vulnerable position.
- The French judicial system likely allows for easier multiplication of appeals, even non-suspensive ones.
- Other countries acted quickly and clearly, leaving little room for contestation.
In France, the Shtandart case has lasted more than three and a half years. In other states, it was resolved in less than fifteen days once authorities were alerted by the collective.
In view of the above, it would not be unfounded to consider that the Shtandart case exists in France only because it was built at and by the heart of its state apparatus. Without even mentioning possible channels of influence, the state would bear a much greater responsibility than the Shtandart lawyers or its captain. The latter ultimately acted only by exploiting the opportunity offered to him.
In this context, France can be seen as a “weak link” that some actors seek to instrumentalize.
This situation reinforces the hypothesis that the Shtandart could contribute, in particular, to creating internal controversies and weakening confidence in national or European institutions. As the Chief of the French Armed Forces (CEMA) recalled, France is a priority target of the Russian interference strategy.
-> LCI, General Thierry Burcard (CEMA), “The big file, France as Putin’s number one target. The alert”, July 11, 2025.
III.3. Strategy of Chaos and Destabilization
Without prejudging his level of awareness or intent, Vladimir Martus’ repeated actions can also be seen in a broader destabilization dynamic. These legal actions, judicial harassment, and associated media coverage may aim to:
- Create fractures within civil society and in the relationship between citizens and authorities.
- Fuel opposition to national and European institutions.
- Erode confidence in the law and in the effectiveness of sanctions, giving the impression they can be circumvented.
This type of approach aligns with elements already well identified by a national weekly:
-> Challenges, “Russian interference: the strategy of chaos as a tool of massive destabilization”, August 5, 2025.
A French journalist, specializing in the Shtandart case, commented on this in the main regional daily:
-> Ouest-France: “Investigation. The Russian ship Shtandart waging Putin’s war even in the Gulf of Morbihan”, May 23, 2025.
III.4. Question of Financing
If the Shtandart plays a role, intentional or not, in a European destabilization strategy, its apparent financial difficulties may not be decisive.
Attention would then focus less on appeals for donations than on the objectives pursued and the payment channels for litigation and legal counsel.
PART IV
Open Lines of Inquiry and Analytical Closure
Without claiming exhaustiveness, it may be useful to explore other angles. More indirect elements could shed light on the persistence of these legal actions, without any being established with certainty.
The proceedings undertaken could serve to document a symbolic resistance, regardless of the likelihood of legal success.
They may also maintain ambiguity regarding practical consequences, even if the law remains unchanged.
The multiplication of appeals can also serve to assess institutional tolerance, observe administrative and judicial reactions, or detect potential procedural weaknesses.
Each setback could mobilize supporters, perceived as hostility, obstinacy, or refusal to close the conflict. Continuing the litigation would then appear preferable to accepting a definitive defeat.
These complementary lines of analysis remain hypothetical and aim to better understand a procedural behavior that is difficult to interpret according to usual standards of legal rationality.
CONCLUSION
The appeals before the Administrative Court of Rennes and the CJEU reveal a complex strategy. The collective limits itself to presenting verifiable facts, noting inconsistencies, and proposing open hypotheses, without making accusations or asserting certainties.
In both instances, the Shtandart exhibits a clear legal weakness:
- at the Administrative Court of Rennes, the reply brief lacks foundation;
- at the CJEU, the appeal regarding the interpretation of the regulation is unlikely to succeed.
The appeals have no suspensive effect and are legally ineffective. They persist despite clear and consistent rulings, justifying an analysis that goes beyond the strictly legal framework. These actions can be interpreted as dilatory harassment, with a possible instrumentalization of France as a strategic arena.
In this atypical situation, the collective considers that posing questions is part of an analytical, not accusatory, approach, contributing to understanding a phenomenon that goes beyond the simple case of the Shtandart.
Readers are invited to share their hypotheses in the comments, either nominally or anonymously. Their contributions will be included in updates to this article.
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Bernard Grua - No Shtandart In Europe 
