A rhetorical analysis of the president of the ‘Les Amis des Grands Voiliers — Sail Training Association France’ in relation to the sanctioned Russian ship, ‘Shtandart’.

Texte en français
Dated 3 January 2025, a letter from Michel Balique, president of Les Amis des Grands Voiliers — Sail Training Association France, provides a remarkable summary of the rhetoric used against activists opposing the Russian ship Shtandart‘s failure to comply with sanctions over the past three years. Submitting this text to ChatGPT delivered an interesting independent analysis. The review demonstrated the causes that have gradually undermined the credibility of the main orchestrator of the circumvention of European regulations for this case.

I. Main rhetorical devices used by Michel Balique

  1. Ad hominem
  2. Straw man
  3. Loaded language / Dysphemism
  4. 4. Appeal to fear
  5. Appeal to consequence
  6. Ethos (appeal to credibility)
  7. Irony / Sarcasm
  8. Binary opposition / False dichotomy

II. Line-by-line annotation of Michel Balique’s letter, identifying and explaining the rhetorical devices used throughout.

Exhibit: Letter from Michel Balique
– English version
– French original version

I. Main rhetorical devices used by Michel Balique

Michel Balique’s letter employs a number of rhetorical devices to defend the presence of the Russian ship Shtandart in European waters and to discredit his critic, Bernard Grua. Below is a breakdown of the main rhetorical devices used, with examples from the text:

1. Ad hominem

Balique attacks Bernard Grua personally rather than addressing the substance of his claims:

  • “…something in which he specializes and which allows him to present himself as a great defender of the Ukrainian people…”
  • “…nothing but ramblings driven by excessive pride.”

These are personal attacks aimed at undermining Grua’s credibility and motives.

2. Straw man

He misrepresents Grua’s argument to make it easier to refute:

  • “…they will not have saved a single life in Ukraine, nor intercepted a single Russian missile or drone.”

This frames Grua’s goal as unrealistically militaristic (stopping missiles or saving lives directly), which likely misrepresents the actual political or symbolic intention behind opposing the ship.

3. Loaded language / Dysphemism

He uses emotionally charged terms to provoke negative reactions against his opponent:

  • “…pamphlet serves no purpose other than to fuel a sterile and hateful controversy…”
  • “…fabrications and articles he has either written himself or dictated.”
  • “…most cynical and contemptible…”

These words convey scorn and contempt, positioning Grua as dishonest and egotistical.

4. Appeal to fear

Balique introduces a dire consequence if the ship is expelled:

  • “…I doubt it will take more than a week before it is seized and its captain imprisoned…”

This is intended to frighten readers with the potential fallout of taking Grua’s side.

5. Appeal to consequence

He suggests that Grua’s actions would help Putin:

  • “…they will have rendered a great service to Putin…”

This device diverts from the merits of the argument to focus on the supposed negative outcome.

6. Ethos (appeal to credibility)

Balique uses his titles to bolster his authority:

  • “President of ‘Les Amis des Grands Voiliers…’”
  • “Knight of the National Order of Maritime Merit”

By invoking his status, he seeks to lend weight to his argument through personal credibility.

7. Irony / Sarcasm

His sign-off is tinged with sarcasm, given the accusatory tone preceding it:

  • > “I wish you an excellent year 2025.”

This creates a rhetorical contrast, subtly mocking the situation or those he addresses.

8. Binary opposition / False dichotomy

He implies that the only two options are keeping the Shtandart in European waters or handing it to Putin:

  • “As long as it remains in European waters… But as soon as it is cast out…”

This excludes more nuanced positions (e.g. allowing the ship under new conditions or further inquiry).

II. Line-by-line annotation of Michel Balique’s letter, identifying and explaining the rhetorical devices used throughout.

From: mbalique@amisdesgrandsvoiliers.org
To: noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
CC: Préfecture Finistère, Atlantic Maritime Prefecture, Brest City Hall, Le Monde, La Croix, Le Télégramme, Le Chasse-Marée, Ouest-France, Tebeo TV, Union of Ukrainians in France, Franco-Ukrainian associations of Brittany, Oxana Melnychuk, Serguei Jirnov

📌 Rhetorical Strategy: Public positioning / Appeal to authority and witnesses
By copying a long list of authorities and media figures, Balique publicly frames the conflict, signaling credibility and exposing his opponent to scrutiny.

Date: January 3, 2025, 6:16 PM

(No rhetorical device here—standard header)

Dear Sir or Madam,

(Standard formal opening—no rhetorical device here)

Since Bernard Grua’s pamphlet serves no purpose other than to fuel a sterile and hateful controversy — something in which he specializes and which allows him to present himself as a great defender of the Ukrainian people — this letter will be my final response.

  • 🎯 Ad hominem: Attacks Grua’s character by calling him a habitual provocateur.
  • 🗣️ Loaded language: “Sterile and hateful controversy” suggests pettiness and malice.
  • 🎭 Sarcasm/Irony: « Great defender of the Ukrainian people » implies insincerity.
  • 🧱 Poisoning the well: Sets up Grua as inherently untrustworthy before any argument is even addressed.

While one can only agree with the second paragraph of his email, the rest is nothing but ramblings driven by excessive pride.

  • 🔨 Condescension: “One can only agree” dismisses dissent.
  • 🗯️ Ad hominem + Loaded language: “Ramblings” and “excessive pride” diminish the content as irrational and egotistical.
  • 🚫 Dismissal without rebuttal: No specific argument is engaged with—just rejected.

All the so-called documents he presents are, in fact, fabrications and articles he has either written himself or dictated.

  • 🗯️ Loaded language: “So-called,” “fabrications,” “dictated” imply deception.
  • 🎯 Ad hominem: Implying he invents or manipulates sources.
  • 📉 Undermining credibility: Suggests Grua’s evidence is illegitimate without substantiating the claim.

What is most cynical and contemptible in Bernard Grua’s behavior is that, even if he succeeds in his goal of forcing the Shtandart out of European waters, he and his fellow collective members will be rubbing their hands with satisfaction.

  • 🗯️ Loaded language: “Cynical,” “contemptible,” “rubbing their hands” are emotionally charged.
  • 🧟 Dehumanization / Suggestive imagery: “Rubbing their hands” evokes glee at others’ misfortune—a villainous image.
  • 🎯 Ad hominem: Again focuses on intent and character rather than actions or facts.

And yet, they will not have saved a single life in Ukraine, nor intercepted a single Russian missile or drone.

  • 🥊 Straw man: Misrepresents the likely political/symbolic aim of Grua’s actions as failing in a military objective.
  • 🔍 Appeal to futility: Suggests the effort is meaningless by holding it to an impossible standard.
  • 💥 False equivalence: Equating symbolic protest with direct military impact.

Worse still, they will have rendered a great service to Putin, who, since 2009, has been trying to seize the ship as a kind of trophy.

  • 🎯 Appeal to consequence: Warns that Grua’s actions help the enemy.
  • 👿 Guilt by association: Implies Grua’s actions align with Putin’s desires.
  • 📚 Historical reference / Appeal to fear: Cites Putin’s long-standing ambition to amplify the stakes.

As long as it remains in European waters, the Russians will not attempt anything.

  • ⚖️ False dichotomy: Implies only two options—keep the ship in Europe or hand it to Russia.
  • 🔮 Speculative logic: Presents assumption as fact (“will not attempt anything”).

But as soon as it is cast out into international waters, I doubt it will take more than a week before it is seized and its captain imprisoned for having spoken out against the war in Ukraine and for calling for Putin’s removal.

  • 🔥 Appeal to fear: Predicts grim consequences if the ship is expelled.
  • 🎯 Pathos: Invokes sympathy for the captain.
  • 🚔 Slippery slope: Suggests immediate catastrophic consequences from one action.
  • 🪤 Trap framing: Suggests that efforts to oppose the ship will backfire and harm anti-Putin voices.

I wish you an excellent year 2025.

  • 🎭 Sarcasm/Irony: A polite close that sharply contrasts with the accusatory tone, functioning as a final jab.
  • 🧊 Tone shift (passive-aggressive): Attempts to reassert dignity or superiority while undermining opponents.

Michel Balique
President of “Les Amis des Grands Voiliers — Sail Training Association France”
Knight of the National Order of Maritime Merit

  • 🏅 Ethos (appeal to authority): Uses titles to lend credibility and moral standing.
  • 📣 Argument from position: Suggests his status qualifies him as a more trustworthy voice than his opponent.

Summary of Key Devices Used:

DevicePurpose
Ad hominemDiscredit Grua personally rather than his arguments
Loaded languageManipulate emotional reaction
Straw manOversimplify and misrepresent the opponent’s stance
Appeal to fearEvoke anxiety about consequences
Appeal to consequenceSuggest harmful outcomes to dissuade support
EthosBoost author’s credibility through titles
Sarcasm/IronyUndermine through tone rather than content
False dichotomyFrame the issue as binary with no middle ground
Slippery slopePredict dire outcomes from limited actions
Guilt by associationLink opponent’s actions with an enemy’s goals

Exhibit: Letter from Michel Balique

English version

From: mbalique@amisdesgrandsvoiliers.org
To: noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
CC: Préfecture Finistère, Atlantic Maritime Prefecture, Brest City Hall, Le Monde, La Croix, Le Télégramme, Le Chasse-Marée, Ouest-France, Tebeo TV, Union of Ukrainians in France, Franco-Ukrainian associations of Brittany, Oxana Melnychuk, Serguei Jirnov

Date: January 3, 2025, 6:16 PM

Dear Sir or Madam,

Since Bernard Grua’s pamphlet serves no purpose other than to fuel a sterile and hateful controversy — something in which he specializes and which allows him to present himself as a great defender of the Ukrainian people — this letter will be my final response.

While one can only agree with the second paragraph of his email, the rest is nothing but ramblings driven by excessive pride. All the so-called documents he presents are, in fact, fabrications and articles he has either written himself or dictated.

What is most cynical and contemptible in Bernard Grua’s behavior is that, even if he succeeds in his goal of forcing the Shtandart out of European waters, he and his fellow collective members will be rubbing their hands with satisfaction. And yet, they will not have saved a single life in Ukraine, nor intercepted a single Russian missile or drone. Worse still, they will have rendered a great service to Putin, who, since 2009, has been trying to seize the ship as a kind of trophy. As long as it remains in European waters, the Russians will not attempt anything. But as soon as it is cast out into international waters, I doubt it will take more than a week before it is seized and its captain imprisoned for having spoken out against the war in Ukraine and for calling for Putin’s removal.

I wish you an excellent year 2025.

Michel Balique
President of “Les Amis des Grands Voiliers — Sail Training Association France”
Knight of the National Order of Maritime Merit

French original version

De : mbalique@amisdesgrandsvoiliers.org
A : noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
Copies : Préfecture Finistère, Préfecture maritime atlantique, Mairie de Brest, Le Monde, La Croix, Le Télégramme, Le Chasse-Marée, Ouest-France, Tebeo TV, Union des Ukrainien de France, associations franco-ukrainiennes de Bretagne, Oxana Melnychuk, Serguei Jirnov

Date: 3 janv. 2025 18:16

Madame, Monsieur,

Le pamphlet de Bernard Grua n’ayant d’autre but que celui d’alimenter une polémique stérile et haineuse dont il est un grand spécialiste, et qui lui permet de se présenter en grand défenseur du peuple Ukrainien ce courrier sera la dernière réponse de ma part.

Si l’on ne peut qu’être d’accord avec le second paragraphe de son mail, tout le reste n’est qu’élucubration dictée par un orgueil démesuré. Tous les soi-disant documents qu’il exhibe sont en fait des montages et des articles qu’il a soit écrits soit dictés.

Et ce qui est le plus cynique, le plus méprisable dans l’attitude de Bernard Grua, c’est que en admettant qu’il parvienne à son but et fasse quitter les eaux européennes au Shtandart, lui et ses amis du collectif se frotteront les mains de plaisir. Et pourtant , ils n’auront épargné aucune vie en Ukraine, il n’auront intercepté aucun missile aucun drone russe. Mieux encore, ils auront rendu un grand service à Poutine qui depuis 2009 ne cesse de tenter de mettre la main sur le bateau comme une sorte de trophée. Tant qu’il est dans les eaux européennes, les Russes ne tenteront rien. Mais dès qu’il sera rejeté dans les eaux internationales, je ne donne pas huit jours avant qu’il soit arraisonné et son capitaine emprisonné pour s’être déclaré contre la guerre en Ukraine et avoir réclamé la destitution de Poutine.

Je vous souhaite une excellente année 2025.

Michel Balique President of “Les Amis des Grands Voiliers — Sail Training Association France” Knight of the National Order of Maritime Merit

See also

How did « Les Amis des Grands Voiliers – Sail Training Association France » deviate from its mandate and damage its reputation by promoting an illicit circumvention of EU sanctions ?

To:

  • Mr Alan James, Chief Executive Officer of Sail Training International and TSRIL.
  • Mr Jan G. van der Burg, Chair of Tall Ships Races International Limited (TSRIL).
  • Ms Vanessa Mori, Deputy CEO/Commercial Director of Sail Training International
  • Ms Magda Makowska, Race Director and Race Operations Committee Secretary of Sail Training International
  • Ms Alison Weston, Finance Manager of Sail Training International

Subject: How did « Les Amis des Grands Voiliers – Sail Training Association France » deviate from its mandate and damage its reputation by promoting an illicit circumvention of EU sanctions ?

31 July 2025

Dear Sir/Madam,

In July 2025, the sanctioned Russian ship Shtandart gave those in doubt ample opportunity to verify that Russian restrictive measures applied to this vessel. The EU port ban was enforced in the French departments of Ille-et-Vilaine (Saint-Malo) and Côtes d’Armor (Saint-Cast-le-Guildo), as well as in Ireland and Denmark. The Shtandart was also banned from entering ports in Jersey, and Great Britain. Earlier, in addition to the port bans, Spain expelled the Shtandart on 27 July 2024, banning it from its territorial waters due to violations committed by the Russian vessel.

The ship’s arrival in La Rochelle, France, on 8 June 2022, when the European ban had been in place for two months, was largely made possible thanks to intense lobbying from Les Amis des Grands Voiliers – Sail Training Association France, led by Michel Balique, the association’s president, and networks mobilised for this purpose. Michel Balique is an ardent propagandist for Vladimir Martus, the captain and hidden owner of the Shtandart. He has presented Martus as an ‘opponent of the Russian regime’, despite the fact that he is close to the presidential administration and Russian propaganda agencies. Balique’s main partner in this endeavour was Patrice Bernier, a local dockmaster. Bernier is also an “administrateur” (director) of the same association.

The association’s efforts extended beyond merely bringing the Russian ship to France. On its behalf, Michel Balique sought out commercial opportunities for the Shtandart at maritime events, continually encouraging and defending the circumvention of sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The situation became so severe that, on 24 June 2024, the European Council admonished France.

Les Amis des Grands Voiliers – Sail Training France is a co-founder of Sail Training International and remains one of its members. In France, it claims to represent tall ships. Complicity in circumventing sanctions is punishable by criminal prosecution: EU, Directive 2024/1226 of 24 April 2024; France, Customs Regulation, Article 459. This could, at the very least, target Michel Balique and Les Amis des Grands Voiliers – Sail Training France. Please read the alarming summary produced by ChatGPT concerning Les Amis des Grands Voiliers – Sail Training France and the Shtandart case below. 

I remain at your disposal for any further detailed information concerning this fraud, which we have been investigating for three years.

Yours sincerely,

Bernard Grua
Former French Navy Officer
Spokesperson

Logo No Shtandart In Europe

No Shtandart In Europe
Email: noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
Website: https://bit.ly/No-Shtandart
Facebook: groups/noshtandartineurope
WhatsApp

Attachment ChatGPT answer

Here’s how Michel Balique ridiculed and discredited the association Les Amis des Grands Voiliers — Sail Training Association France (AGV):

🎭 Summary of the Ridicule and Discrediting

1. Lobbying Allegations and Dishonesty

  • Critics, notably the blog No Shtandart In Europe led by Bernard Grua, accuse Balique and AGV of serving as a lobby for the Russian vessel Shtandart, enabling it to circumvent EU sanctions during the 2022‑2025 conflict period [1].
  • Balique is portrayed as misusing the association’s name and network to promote the ship and its owner, rather than pursuing AGV’s mission of Sail Training and friendship across nations [1], [2].

2. Arguments Stripped of Substance

  • In his public responses (e.g. 4 July 2022, 3 January 2025), Balique is accused of resorting to personal insults, grandiloquent rhetoric, distortion of facts, and repeated deflections — including calling critics “idiots” or “anti‑Russia primaries” — instead of engaging on substance [3].
  • Rather than address legal or regulatory concerns, he deploys ad hominem attacks, claims defamation, and accuses opponents of hatred and racism for raising sanctions-related issues [4].

3. Mockery of European Institutions

  • He dismisses decisions made by French and EU authorities, including a November 2024 Conseil d’État ruling, calling them “ridiculous” and “absolute nonsense” (“Connerie absolue”) — a tone critics view as both disrespectful and poorly reasoned [5].
  • Bernard Grua’s writings emphasize that AGV under Balique diverged sharply from its original apolitical purpose and instead actively aided a Russian propaganda ship in violation of EU law [2].

In Concrete Terms: How the Ridicule Was Waged

| Mode of Ridicule | Description |

  • Hyperbole & Name‑calling | Labeling critics as “idiots”, “anti‑Russia primaries”, or “pure souche” French, invoking nationalist clichés [3]
  • Dismissal of Critics’ Legality Arguments| Referring to legal interventions and sanctions enforcement as “diffamation”, “haine”, “appels à la violence”, or “racisme anti‑russe” [6], [5]
  • Grandstanding without Proof| Presenting himself in lofty terms but failing to provide factual evidence or technical justification that the Shtandart was legally cleared to dock in EU ports [7], [8]

🔍 Why This Discredits the Association

  • Misalignment with Mandate: AGV was created to promote tall ship sail training across cultures — Balique’s actions are seen as politicizing the group and using it for pro‑Russian activism [2], [1].
  • Reputational Damage: Labelled by critics as a “network of influence” or even complicit in fraud, AGV’s credibility has been seriously undermined by what amounts to servile advocacy for a sanctioned vessel [1], [2].
  • Intellectual Vacuity: The repeated use of insults or gross generalizations instead of legal reasoning portrays Balique — and through him, AGV — as intellectually unserious in the public debate [4], [7].

✅ Bottom Line

Michel Balique ridiculed and discredited Les Amis des Grands Voiliers primarily by converting its platform into a pro‑Shtandart lobbying machine, repeatedly dodging substantive legal critique, and replacing it with rhetorical excess and personal invective. The result, according to critics, was to tarnish the association’s founders’ intentions and academic legitimacy, presenting it as complicit in illicit circumvention of EU sanctions.

Notes

  1. “Michel Balique, président de l’association des Amis des Grands Voiliers, et le « Shtandart » — No Shtandart In Europe”
  2. “Amis des Grands Voiliers, Michel Balique canonne Ouest-France et fait plouf. — No Shtandart In Europe”
  3. “« Shtandart »: l’ukrainophobie de Michel Balique, président de l’association « Les Amis des Grands Voiliers » et VRP de Vladimir Martus — No Shtandart In Europe”
  4. “Shtandart : une diatribe de Michel Balique, président de l’association “Amis des Grands Voiliers”, 03/01/2025 | Medium”
  5. “Shtandart : les vérités de Michel Balique, président de l’association « Amis des grands voiliers » — No Shtandart In Europe”
  6. “Pourquoi Michel Balique, président de l’association « Amis des grands voiliers », est-il devenu un dégât collatéral du navire russe « Shtandart » ? — No Shtandart In Europe”
  7. “Michel Balique, président de l’association « Amis des Grands Voiliers », lance une nouvelle charge contre les détracteur du navire russe “Shtandart”, 04/07/2022. | Medium”
  8. “Michel Balique, président Amis des Grands Voiliers: Accueillir le Shtandart — 21/03/2022 | Medium”

Michel Balique, Patrice Bernier and Vladimir Martus

Shtandart: Patrice Bernier, Michel Balique and Vladimir Martus at the 2023 Armada de Rouen.
Patrice Bernier, Michel Balique and Vladimir Martus at the 2023 Armada de Rouen.
Shtandart: in June 2024 Patrice Bernier presented Michel Balique with the Order of Maritime Merit on board the tall ship Belem.
In June 2024 Patrice Bernier presented Michel Balique with the Order of Maritime Merit on board the tall ship Belem.
Shtandart: Vladimir Martus celebrating Michel Balique's decoration on board the tall ship Belem.
Vladimir Martus celebrating Michel Balique’s decoration on board the tall ship Belem.

Screen captures from ChatGPT

Critics, notably the blog No Shtandart In Europe led by Bernard Grua, accuse Balique and AGV of serving as a lobby for the Russian vessel Shtandart, enabling it to circumvent EU sanctions during the 2022‑2025 conflict period [1].
Michel Balique ridiculed and discredited Les Amis des Grands Voiliers primarily by converting its platform into a pro‑Shtandart lobbying machine, repeatedly dodging substantive legal critique, and replacing it with rhetorical excess and personal invective.

See also

Det sanktionerede russiske skib « Shtandart » har planlagt en ulovlig mellemlanding i Esbjerg den 8. til 9. august 2025 under « Tall Ships Races ».

Pressemeddelelse

Det sanktionerede russiske skib Shtandart, MMSI 518999255, har planlagt en ulovlig mellemlanding i Esbjerg fra den 8. til den 9. august 2025 under festivalen « Tall Ships Races ». Det kan også foretage uanmeldte og uautoriserede mellemlandinger i andre havne. Se venligst det brev, vi har sendt til Udenrigsministeriet og de maritime og toldmyndigheder i Kongeriget Danmark nedenfor.

Vi vil desuden gerne  understrege, at gerningsmanden anvender taktikker fra den russiske skyggeflåde. Når det ikke kan tvinge sig ind, tyer det desuden til humanitær afpresning og offerretorik for at manipulere den offentlige mening.

To: 

  • Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Danish Maritime Authority
  • Danish Customs
  • Esbjerg Port Authority

Copies:

  • Ukrainian Embassy in Denmark
  • Ukraine House in Denmark 
  • Sail Training International

Subject: The private yacht Shtandart MMSI 518999255, a Russian vessel under sanctions, is preparing to call at Esbjerg for the Tall Ships Races. 

25 July 2025

Dear Sir/Madam,

The Shtandart MMSI 518999255, a Russian vessel under sanctions, is preparing to call at Esbjerg for the Tall Ships Races. It claims not to be under a Russian flag, to be managed by a German company, and to be owned by a Finnish citizen. Given that it frequently disconnects its automatic identification system (AIS), it is clear that this is a set-up designed to circumvent the sanctions, and that the Shtandart is a vessel belonging to the Russian shadow fleet.

According to its website, the Shtandart will call at Esbjerg from 8 to 9 August 2025: https://shtandart.eu/services/sail-with-us/.

1. Since 6 June 2024, the Russian vessel Shtandart has been flying the Cook Islands flag of convenience.

On 6 June 2024, the Shtandart, which previously belonged to the St Petersburg-based company Shtandart Project, switched its Russian flag for that of the Cook Islands in order to circumvent the restrictive port measures taken against Russia. These measures are designed to sanction Russia for the Bucha massacre. They are defined in Article 3ea of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. 

It should be noted that paragraph 2 of Article 3ea specifies that changing the flag does not remove the vessel from the scope of the sanctions.

Even when registered in the Cook Islands, the Shtandart frequently flies a large Russian Empire flag at the top of the mainmast. It is also possible to check the Shtandart’s profiles on Marine Traffic and Vessel Finder. Although these accounts were created after the Shtandart was registered in the Cook Islands, the ship is depicted flying the Russian national flag, the Russian imperial flag and the Russian war flame.

Furthermore, to put an end to the fallacious version of the sanctions circulating in France, on 24 June 2024 the European Council issued CFSP Declaration No. 2024/1744 and (EU) Regulation No. 2024/1745, which clarified that replicas of historic ships were indeed covered by the sanctions. This clarification explicitly refers to the Shtandart and now appears in paragraph 3a) of Article 3ea of (EU) Regulation No 833/2014. This is a CLARIFICATION and not an ‘extension’, as claimed by the owner of the Shtandart.

2. The Shtandart would be managed by a ‘German’ company.

The commercial company, ‘Martus TV GmbH’ is domiciled at a P.O. Box in Hamburg. According to the attached certificate, the main shareholder is a Russian citizen Vladimir Martus, the skipper of the Shtandart. He holds 80% of the shares in ‘Martus TV GmbH’. The remaining 20% is owned by Russian citizen Irina Ermakova. She is Vladimir Martus’s wife. Vladimir Martus is the Chairman and Managing Director. Therefore, ‘Martus TV GmbH’ is a Russian shadow company, controlled and owned by a Russian citizen. On the same certificate, Vladimir Martus claims to hold dual Russian and Ukrainian nationality. This claim is obviously false.

‘Martus TV GmbH’, a Russian shadow company owned and controlled by Vladimir Martus, claims to be the ‘managing owner’ of the Shtandart. Consequently, the Russian citizen, Vladimir Martus is the hidden but very real owner of the Shtandart through ‘Martus TV GmbH’.

3. The Shtandart would be ‘owned’ by a Finnish citizen.

During the first half of 2024, ownership was transferred from the company ‘Shtandart Project’ to Maria (Mariia) Martus, daughter of Vladimir Martus. A Russian citizen born in Russia, Maria Martus completed her higher education in Helsinki. This enabled her to obtain a Finnish passport. However, she is merely a front for circumventing European sanctions. As explained above, the real owner is Vladimir Martus.

4. Like the other ships in the Russian shadow fleet, the Shtandart conceals its position.

While passing Kilmore Quay en route to Dublin in the Irish Sea on 6 July 2025, the Shtandart disconnected its automatic identification system (AIS) at 10:30 UTC. It did not activate the system again until it was anchored off the village of Killiney, as it had not obtained permission to call at Dublin or any other Irish port. 

Then, on 9 July 2025 at 00:00 UTC, the Russian vessel made an unannounced and unauthorised overnight call at the small Irish port of Clogherhead. 

On 17 July 2025, while attempting to dock at Scapa Pier in the UK, the Shtandart again disconnected its AIS. It was expelled by the British Coastguard. 

5. The close links between the Shtandart and the Russian regime have been proven.

Hundreds of Russian documents prove Vladimir Martus’ connections with the Russian presidential administration and its propaganda outlets. This contradicts his alleged status as an ‘opponent’ of the regime. The private yacht Shtandart is not the training ship it claims to be either. To avoid making this text too long, we will simply refer to the press release from the Russian Consulate General in Edinburgh, which raises questions about the Shtandart’s real mission(s).

Further information can be found in the letter we sent to the ‘Norwegian Directorate for Export Control and Sanctions’ (DEKSA) on 23 July 2025 in response to a Vladimir Martus’ ultimatum.

If you have any questions, we would be happy to answer them in writing or via WhatsApp. We would be delighted to share some or all of the extensive documentation we have accumulated over the past three years on the outlaw Martus and the Shtandart, an ambassador for Russian imperialist propaganda.

Yours sincerely,

Bernard Grua, Nantes, Brittany, France
Former officer in the French Navy
Spokesman

Logo No Shtandart In Europe

No Shtandart In Europe
Email: noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
Website: https://bit.ly/No-Shtandart
Facebook: groups/noshtandartineurope
WhatsApp

Attachment

I første halvdel af 2024 blev ejerskabet overført fra virksomheden ›Shtandart Project‹ til Maria (Mariia) Martus, datter af Vladimir Martus.

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¿Por qué el buque sancionado «Shtandart» forma parte de la flota fantasma rusa?

This article in English
Cet article en Français
El Shtandart MMSI 518999255, buque sujeto a sanciones, afirma no estar bajo pabellón ruso, estar gestionado por una empresa alemana y pertenecer a una ciudadana finlandesa. Si a esto le sumamos el hecho de que desconecta con frecuencia su sistema de identificación automática (AIS), queda claro que se trata de un montaje destinado a eludir las sanciones y de un buque perteneciente a la flota fantasma rusa.

Mientras tanto, con el fin de alimentar la indignación y el odio del público contra las autoridades y las instituciones, el capitán y propietario oculto del Shtandart afirma que su barco está sancionado porque «un día nació en Rusia».
  1. El buque ruso Shtandart navega bajo pabellón de conveniencia de las Islas Cook desde el 6 de junio de 2024.
  2. El Shtandart estaría gestionado por una empresa «alemana».
  3. El Shtandart sería «propiedad» de una ciudadana finlandesa.
  4. Al igual que otros barcos de la flota fantasma rusa, el Shtandart oculta su posición.
  5. Se han demostrado los estrechos vínculos entre el Shtandart y el régimen ruso.

1. El buque ruso Shtandart navega bajo pabellón de conveniencia de las Islas Cook desde el 6 de junio de 2024.

El 6 de junio de 2024, el Shtandart, MMSI 518999255, que anteriormente pertenecía a la empresa «Shtandart Project», con sede en San Petersburgo, cambió su pabellón ruso por el de las Islas Cook, con el fin de eludir las medidas restrictivas portuarias adoptadas contra Rusia. Estas medidas tienen por objeto sancionar a Rusia por la masacre de Bucha. Se definen en el artículo 3 sexies bis del Reglamento (UE) n.º 833/2014. Cabe señalar que en el apartado 2 del artículo 3 sexies bis se especifica que un cambio de pabellón no permite quedar fuera del ámbito de aplicación de las sanciones.

Shtandart, Vessel Finder, 25/07/2025: pavillon impérial russe, flamme de guerre russe, pavillon national russe
Shtandart, Vessel Finder, 25/07/2025: pabellón imperial ruso, bandera de guerra rusa, pabellón nacional ruso

El Shtandart, aunque está registrado en las Islas Cook, suele enarbolar una gran bandera del Imperio ruso en lo alto del mástil mayor, o en el mástil de proa. También es posible consultar los perfiles del Shtandart en Marine Traffic y Vessel Finder. Aunque estas cuentas se crearon después del registro del Shtandart en las Islas Cook, el barco aparece representado con la bandera imperial rusa, la bandera de guerra rusa y la bandera nacional rusa.

Por otra parte, con el fin de poner fin a la versión engañosa de las sanciones que circulaba en Francia, el Consejo Europeo, el 24 de junio de 2024, mediante la Decisión PESC n.º 2024/1744 y el Reglamento (UE) n.º 2024/1745, precisó que las réplicas de buques históricos sí estaban sujetas a las sanciones. Esta precisión, que se refiere explícitamente al Shtandart, figura ahora en el apartado 3a) del artículo 3 sexies bis del Reglamento (UE) n.º 833/2014. Se trata de una ACLARACIÓN y no de una «ampliación», como afirma el propietario del Shtandart.

2. El Shtandart estaría gestionado por una empresa «alemana».

La sociedad mercantil «Martus TV GmbH» tiene su domicilio social en un apartado postal de Hamburgo. Según el certificado adjunto, el principal accionista es un ciudadano ruso, Vladimir Martus, patrón del Shtandart. Posee el 80 % de las acciones de «Martus TV GmbH». El 20 % restante es propiedad de la ciudadana rusa Irina Ermakova. Esta es la esposa de Vladimir Martus. Este último es presidente y director general de «Martus TV GmbH». Por lo tanto, «Martus TV GmbH» es una sociedad fantasma rusa, controlada y propiedad de un ciudadano ruso. En este certificado, Vladimir Martus afirma tener doble nacionalidad rusa y ucraniana. Esta afirmación es evidentemente falsa.

«Martus TV GmbH», una sociedad fantasma rusa propiedad y controlada por Vladimir Martus, afirma ser la « managing owner » del Shtandart. Por consiguiente, el ciudadano ruso Vladimir Martus es el propietario oculto, pero real, del Shtandart, a través de «Martus TV GmbH».

3. El Shtandart sería «propiedad» de una ciudadana finlandesa.

Durante el primer semestre de 2024, la propiedad del Shtandart pasó de la empresa «Shtandart Project» a Maria (Mariia) Martus, la hija de Vladimir Martus. Ciudadana rusa nacida en Rusia, Maria Martus cursó sus estudios superiores en la Universidad Aalto de Helsinki. De este modo, pudo obtener un pasaporte finlandés.

Facebook: Maria Martus, ShtandartStructural Engineer at WSP in Finland, Aalto University
Facebook: Maria Martus
LinkedIn: Mariia Martus, ShtandartStructural Engineer at WSP in Finland, Aalto University
LinkedIn: Mariia Martus

Maria (Mariia) Martus, empleada de WSP Finlandia, es solo una testaferro al servicio de la elusión de las sanciones europeas. El verdadero propietario es, como se ha expuesto anteriormente, Vladimir Martus.

4. Al igual que otros barcos de la flota fantasma rusa, el Shtandart oculta su posición.

En el mar de Irlanda, poco después de pasar Kilmore Quay en dirección a Dublín, el Shtandart desconectó su sistema de identificación automática (AIS) el 6 de julio a las 10:30 UTC. No lo volvió a encender hasta que fondeó frente a la localidad de Killiney, ya que no había obtenido autorización para atracar en Dublín ni en ningún otro puerto irlandés.

Le 8 juillet 2025, un patrouilleur des garde-côtes irlandais surveille le navire russe Shtandart, soumis à des sanctions, non annoncé et non autorisé, dans la baie de Killiney, au sud de Dublin.
El 8 de julio de 2025, una patrullera de la guardia costera irlandesa vigila el buque ruso Shtandart, sujeto a sanciones, no anunciado y no autorizado, en la bahía de Killiney, al sur de Dublín.

El 9 de julio de 2025 a las 00:00 UTC, el buque ruso realizó una escala nocturna no anunciada y no autorizada en el pequeño puerto de Clogherhead, Irlanda.

El 17 de julio de 2025, mientras intentaba atracar en Scapa Pier, Escocia, el Shtandart volvió a desconectar su AIS. Fue expulsado por la guardia costera británica.

5. Se han demostrado los estrechos vínculos entre el Shtandart y el régimen ruso.

Vladimir Martus, capitaine et propriétaire occulte du navire russe Shtandart
Vladimir Martus, capitán y propietario oculto del buque ruso Shtandart.

Cientos de documentos rusos atestiguan los vínculos de Vladimir Martus con la administración presidencial rusa y sus servicios de propaganda, lo que contradice su supuesta condición de «opositor». El yate privado Shtandart tampoco es el «buque escuela» que él dice que es. Para no alargar este texto, nos limitaremos a remitir al comunicado de prensa del Consulado General de Rusia en Edimburgo, que plantea preguntas sobre la verdadera misión o misiones del Shtandart.

Quienes deseen obtener más información pueden consultar la carta documentada que enviamos el 23 de julio de 2025 a la «Dirección Noruega de Control de Exportaciones y Sanciones» (DEKSA), en respuesta al ultimátum que le fue enviado por Vladimir Martus.

Si tiene alguna pregunta, estaremos encantados de responderla por escrito o por WhatsApp. Nos complacerá compartir con usted toda o parte de la extensa documentación que hemos recopilado durante los últimos tres años sobre el forajido Martus y el buque Shtandart, embajador de la propaganda imperialista rusa.

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No Shtandart In Europe
Email: noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
Website: https://bit.ly/No-Shtandart
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Archivo adjunto

La société commerciale « Martus TV GmbH » est domiciliée dans une boîte postale à Hambourg. Selon l'attestation jointe, le principal actionnaire est un citoyen russe, Vladimir Martus, skipper du Shtandart. Il détient 80 % des parts de « Martus TV GmbH ».

Sobre el mismo tema

Pourquoi le navire sous sanctions “Shtandart » fait-il partie de la flotte fantôme russe ?

This article in English
Este artículo en Español

Le Shtandart MMSI 518999255, navire sous sanctions, prétend ne pas être sous pavillon russe, être géré par une société allemande et appartenir à une citoyenne finlandaise. Si l’on ajoute à cela le fait qu’il déconnecte fréquemment son système d’identification automatique (AIS), il apparaît clairement qu’il s’agit d’un montage destiné à contourner les sanctions et d’un navire appartenant à la flotte fantôme russe. Pendant ce temps, afin d’alimenter l’indignation et la haine du public contre les autorités et les institutions, le skipper et propriétaire caché du Shtandart prétend que c’est parce qu’il est « un jour né en Russie » que son navire est sanctionné.

  1. Le yacht privé russe Shtandart est sous pavillon de complaisance des îles Cook depuis le 6 juin 2024.
  2. Le yacht privé Shtandart est géré par une société fantôme 100% russe, artificiellement domiciliée en Allemagne et contrôlée par vladimir Martus.
  3. Le yacht privé Shtandart est la propriété du russe Vladimir Martus.
  4. Comme les autres navires de la flotte fantôme russe, le Shtandart dissimule sa position.
  5. Les liens étroits entre le Shtandart et le régime russe sont prouvés.

1. Le yacht privé russe Shtandart est sous pavillon de complaisance des îles Cook depuis le 6 juin 2024.

Le 6 juin 2024, le Shtandart, MMSI 518999255, qui appartenait précédemment à la société « Shtandart Project » domiciliée à Saint-Pétersbourg, a échangé son pavillon russe contre celui des îles Cook, dans le but de contourner les mesures restrictives portuaires prises contre la Russie. Ces mesures visent à sanctionner la Russie pour le massacre de Boutcha. Elles sont définies à l’Article 3 sexies bis du règlement (UE) n° 833/2014. Il convient de noter qu’au paragraphe 2 de de l’Article 3 sexies bis, il est précisé qu’un changement de pavillon ne permet pas de sortir du champ des sanctions.

Shtandart, Vessel Finder, 25/07/2025: pavillon impérial russe, flamme de guerre russe, pavillon national russe
Shtandart, Vessel Finder, 25/07/2025: pavillon impérial russe, flamme de guerre russe, pavillon national russe

Le Shtandart, même immatriculé aux îles Cook, arbore fréquemment un large pavillon de l’Empire russe en tête du grand mât, voire du mât de misaine. Il est également possible de consulter les profils du Shtandart sur Marine Traffic et Vessel Finder. Bien que ces comptes aient été créés après l’enregistrement du Shtandart aux îles Cook, le navire est représenté arborant le pavillon impérial russe, la flamme de guerre russe et le pavillon national russe.

Par ailleurs, dans le but de mettre fin à la version fallacieuse des sanctions qui circulait en France, le Conseil européen, le 24 juin 2024, par la décision PESC n° 2024/1744 et le règlement (UE) n° 2024/1745, a précisé que les répliques de navires historiques étaient bien concernées par les sanctions. Cette précision, qui vise explicitement le Shtandart, figure désormais au paragraphe 3a) de l’Article 3 sexies bis du règlement (UE) n° 833/2014. Il s’agit d’une CLARIFICATION et non pas d’une « extension », comme le prétend le propriétaire du Shtandart.

2. Le yacht privé Shtandart est géré par une société fantôme 100% russe, artificiellement domiciliée en Allemagne et contrôlée par vladimir Martus.

La société commerciale « Martus TV GmbH » est domiciliée dans une boîte postale à Hambourg. Selon l’attestation jointe, le principal actionnaire est un citoyen russe, Vladimir Martus, skipper du Shtandart. Il détient 80 % des parts de « Martus TV GmbH ». Les 20 % restants sont la propriété de la citoyenne russe Irina Ermakova. Elle est l’épouse de Vladimir Martus. Ce dernier est président et directeur général de  « Martus TV GmbH ». Par conséquent, « Martus TV GmbH » est une société fantôme russe, contrôlée et détenue par un citoyen russe. Sur cette attestation, Vladimir Martus prétend avoir la double nationalité russe et ukrainienne. Cette affirmation est évidemment fausse.

« Martus TV GmbH »,  une société fantôme russe détenue et contrôlée par Vladimir Martus, prétend être le « managing owner » du Shtandart. En conséquence, le citoyen russe Vladimir Martus est le propriétaire occulte, mais bien réel, du Shtandart, par l’intermédiaire de « Martus TV GmbH ».

3. Le yacht privé Shtandart est la propriété du russe Vladimir Martus.

Au cours du premier semestre 2024, la « propriété » du Shtandart a été transférée de la société « Shtandart Project » à Maria (Mariia) Martus, la fille de Vladimir Martus. Citoyenne russe née en Russie, Maria Martus a effectué ses études supérieures à l’université Aalto d’Helsinki. Elle a ainsi pu obtenir un passeport finlandais.

Facebook: Maria Martus, ShtandartStructural Engineer at WSP in Finland, Aalto University
Facebook: Maria Martus
LinkedIn: Mariia Martus, ShtandartStructural Engineer at WSP in Finland, Aalto University
LinkedIn: Mariia Martus

Maria (Mariia) Martus, employée de WSP Finlande, n’est qu’un prête-nom au service du contournement des sanctions européennes. Le véritable propriétaire est, comme exposé ci-dessus, Vladimir Martus.

4. Comme les autres navires de la flotte fantôme russe, le Shtandart dissimule sa position.

Le Shtandart a dissimulé sa position sans interruption du 6 juin 2022 au printemps 2024. Ceci avait été signalée au Préfet maritime Commandant en chef pour l’Atlantique dès le 30 juin 2022 par le collectif No Shtandart in Europe.

Cette pratique a contribué à l’interdiction et à l’expulsion du Shtandart des eaux territoriales espagnoles le 27 juillet 2024.

En mer d’Irlande, peu après avoir passé Kilmore Quay en direction de Dublin, le Shtandart a déconnecté son système d’identification automatique (AIS) le 6 juillet 2025 à 10 h 30 UTC. Il ne l’a rallumé qu’une fois au mouillage, au large du village de Killiney, car il n’avait pas obtenu l’autorisation de faire escale à Dublin ni dans aucun autre port irlandais. 

Le 8 juillet 2025, un patrouilleur des garde-côtes irlandais surveille le navire russe Shtandart, soumis à des sanctions, non annoncé et non autorisé, dans la baie de Killiney, au sud de Dublin.
Le 8 juillet 2025, un patrouilleur des garde-côtes irlandais surveille le navire russe Shtandart, soumis à des sanctions, non annoncé et non autorisé, dans la baie de Killiney, au sud de Dublin.

Le 9 juillet 2025 à 00 h 00 UTC, le navire russe a effectué une escale nocturne non annoncée et non autorisée dans le petit port de Clogherhead, Irlande.

Le 17 juillet 2025, alors qu’il tentait d’accoster à Scapa Pier, Écosse, le Shtandart a de nouveau déconnecté son AIS. Il en a été expulsé par les gardes-côtes britanniques. 

Le Shtandart, a reconnecté, le 2 août 2025, son système d’identification automatique (AIS) en entrant dans les eaux territoriales françaises Il avait dissimulé sa position pendant six jours et sept heures, soit du 27 juillet 2025 à 0 h 15 UTC au 2 août 2025 à 7 h 00 UTC.

5. Les liens étroits entre le Shtandart et le régime russe sont prouvés.

Vladimir Martus, capitaine et propriétaire occulte du navire russe Shtandart
Vladimir Martus, capitaine et propriétaire occulte du navire russe Shtandart

Des centaines de documents russes attestent des liens de Vladimir Martus avec l’administration présidentielle russe et ses services de propagande, ce qui contredit son prétendu statut d’ “opposant”. Le yacht privé Shtandart n’est pas non plus le “navire-école” qu’il annonce être. Pour ne pas allonger ce texte, nous nous contenterons de renvoyer au communiqué de presse du Consulat général de Russie à Edimbourg, qui soulève des questions sur la ou les véritables missions du Shtandart.

Ceux qui souhaitent obtenir plus d’informations peuvent utilement se reporter au courrier documenté que nous avons envoyé le 23 juillet 2025 à la « Direction norvégienne du contrôle des exportations et des sanctions » (DEKSA) de Norvège, en réponse à l’ultimatum qui lui a été adressé par Vladimir Martus.

Dans le cas où vous auriez des questions, nous serions heureux d’y répondre par écrit ou par WhatsApp. Nous serions ravis de partager avec vous tout ou partie de l’épaisse documentation que nous avons accumulée au cours des trois dernières années sur le hors-la-loi Martus et sur le navire Shtandart, ambassadeur de la propagande impérialiste russe.

Logo No Shtandart In Europe

No Shtandart In Europe
Email: noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
Website: https://bit.ly/No-Shtandart
Facebook: groups/noshtandartineurope
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Pièce jointe

La société commerciale « Martus TV GmbH » est domiciliée dans une boîte postale à Hambourg. Selon l'attestation jointe, le principal actionnaire est un citoyen russe, Vladimir Martus, skipper du Shtandart. Il détient 80 % des parts de « Martus TV GmbH ».

Sur le même sujet

Why is the sanctioned ship ‘Shtandart’ part of the Russian shadow fleet?

Cet article en Français
Este artículo en Español
The Shtandart MMSI 518999255, a vessel under sanctions, claims not to be under a Russian flag, to be managed by a German company, and to be owned by a Finnish citizen. Given that it frequently disconnects its AIS, it is clear that this is a set-up designed to circumvent the sanctions, and that the Shtandart is a vessel belonging to the Russian shadow fleet. Meanwhile, in order to fuel public outrage and hatred against the authorities and the institutions, the Shtandart’s skipper and hidden owner pretends that it is because he was « once born in Russia » that his ship is sanctioned.
  1. Since 6 June 2024, the Russian vessel Shtandart has been flying the Cook Islands flag of convenience.
  2. The Shtandart would be managed by a ‘German’ company.
  3. The Shtandart would be ‘owned’ by a Finnish citizen.
  4. Like the other ships in the Russian shadow fleet, the Shtandart conceals its position.
  5. The close links between the Shtandart and the Russian regime have been proven.

1. Since 6 June 2024, the Russian vessel Shtandart has been flying the Cook Islands flag of convenience.

On 6 June 2024, the Shtandart MMSI 518999255, which previously belonged to the St Petersburg-based company Shtandart Project, switched its Russian flag for that of the Cook Islands in order to circumvent the restrictive port measures taken against Russia. These measures are designed to sanction Russia for the Bucha massacre. They are defined in Article 3ea of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. 

It should be noted that paragraph 2 of Article 3ea specifies that changing the flag does not remove the vessel from the scope of the sanctions.

Shtandart, Vessel Finder, 25/07/2025: Russian imperial flag, Russian war flame and Russian national flag.
Shtandart, Vessel Finder, 25/07/2025: Russian imperial flag, Russian war flame and Russian national flag.

Even when registered in the Cook Islands, the Shtandart frequently flies a large Russian Empire flag at the top of the main mast, or even the foremast. It is also possible to check the Shtandart’s profiles on Marine Traffic and Vessel Finder. Although these accounts were created after the Shtandart was registered in the Cook Islands, the ship is depicted flying the Russian imperial flag, the Russian war flame and the Russian national flag.

Furthermore, to put an end to the fallacious version of the sanctions circulating in France, on 24 June 2024 the European Council issued CFSP Declaration No. 2024/1744 and (EU) Regulation No. 2024/1745, which clarified that replicas of historic ships were indeed covered by the sanctions. This clarification explicitly refers to the Shtandart and now appears in paragraph 3a) of Article 3ea of (EU) Regulation No 833/2014. This is a CLARIFICATION and not an ‘extension’, as claimed by the owner of the Shtandart.

2. The Shtandart would be managed by a ‘German’ company.

The commercial company, ‘Martus TV GmbH’ is domiciled at a P.O. Box in Hamburg. According to the attached certificate, the main shareholder is a Russian citizen Vladimir Martus, the skipper of the Shtandart. He holds 80% of the shares in ‘Martus TV GmbH’. The remaining 20% is owned by Russian citizen Irina Ermakova. She is Vladimir Martus’s wife. Vladimir Martus is the Chairman and Managing Director. Therefore, ‘Martus TV GmbH’ is a Russian shadow company, controlled and owned by a Russian citizen. On the same certificate, Vladimir Martus claims to hold dual Russian and Ukrainian nationality. This claim is obviously false.

‘Martus TV GmbH’, a Russian shadow company owned and controlled by Vladimir Martus, claims to be the ‘managing owner’ of the Shtandart. Consequently, the Russian citizen, Vladimir Martus is the hidden but very real owner of the Shtandart through ‘Martus TV GmbH’.

3. The Shtandart would be ‘owned’ by a Finnish citizen.

During the first half of 2024, ownership was transferred from the company ‘Shtandart Project’ to Maria (Mariia) Martus, daughter of Vladimir Martus. A Russian citizen born in Russia, Maria Martus completed her higher education at Aalto University in Helsinki. This enabled her to obtain a Finnish passport.

Facebook: Maria Martus, Shtandart, Structural Engineer at WSP in Finland, Aalto University
Facebook: Maria Martus
LinkedIn: Mariia Martus, ShtandartStructural Engineer at WSP in Finland, Aalto University
LinkedIn: Mariia Martus

However, Maria (Mariia) Martus, employee at WSP Finland, is merely a front for circumventing European sanctions. As explained above, the real owner is Vladimir Martus.

4. Like the other ships in the Russian shadow fleet, the Shtandart conceals its position.

While passing Kilmore Quay en route to Dublin in the Irish Sea on 6 July 2025, the Shtandart disconnected its automatic identification system (AIS) at 10:30 UTC. It did not activate the system again until it was anchored off the village of Killiney, as it had not obtained permission to call at Dublin or any other Irish port. 

On 8 July 2025, an Irish coastguard patrol boat monitors the sanctioned Russian vessel Shtandart, unannounced and unauthorised, in Killiney Bay, south of Dublin.
On 8 July 2025, an Irish coastguard patrol boat monitors the sanctioned Russian vessel Shtandart, unannounced and unauthorised, in Killiney Bay, south of Dublin.

Then, on 9 July 2025 at 00:00 UTC, the Russian vessel made an unannounced and unauthorised overnight call at the small Irish port of Clogherhead. 

On 17 July 2025, while attempting to dock at Scapa Pier in the UK, the Shtandart again disconnected its AIS. It was expelled by the British Coastguard. 

Vladimir Martus, captain and secret owner of the Russian ship Shtandart
Vladimir Martus, captain and secret owner of the Russian ship Shtandart

Hundreds of Russian documents prove Vladimir Martus’ connections with the Russian presidential administration and its propaganda outlets. This contradicts his alleged status as an ‘opponent’ of the regime. The private yacht Shtandart is not the training ship it claims to be either. To avoid making this text too long, we will simply refer to the press release from the Russian Consulate General in Edinburgh, which raises questions about the Shtandart’s real mission(s).

Further information can be found in the letter we sent to the ‘Norwegian Directorate for Export Control and Sanctions’ (DEKSA) on 23 July 2025 in response to a Vladimir Martus’ ultimatum.

If you have any questions, we would be happy to answer them in writing or via WhatsApp. We would be delighted to share some or all of the extensive documentation we have accumulated over the past three years on the outlaw Martus and the Shtandart, an ambassador for Russian imperialist propaganda.

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No Shtandart In Europe
Email: noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
Website: https://bit.ly/No-Shtandart
Facebook: groups/noshtandartineurope
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Attachment

The commercial company, ‘Martus TV GmbH’ is domiciled at a P.O. Box in Hamburg. According to the attached certificate, the main shareholder is a Russian citizen Vladimir Martus, the skipper of the Shtandart.

On the same topic

Why will, very soon, the sanctioned ship « Shtandart » represent Russian interests in Norway?

Vladimir Martus, the Russian fraudster who is the skipper and hidden owner of the Shtandart, delivered his usual stream of lies to the Norwegian Directorate for Export Control and Sanctions. But he did even better than that. He placed himself on an equal footing with the Norwegian authorities. He reserved, for himself, the right to act as he wishes, according to his ‘interpretation’ of the law or to his fallacious presentation of the ‘spirit of the sanctions policy’.

We have sent a letter detailing what the outlaw is trying to hide, and debunking the disinformation spread by this Moscow propaganda agent. It is high time that the vatnik and his gopniks gang are firmly reminded that Norway is neither Russia nor Ukrainian territory occupied by the Russian army.

To:
Direktoratet for eksportkonroll og sanksjoner (DEKSA)
Snarøyveien 36
1364 Fornebu
Norway

Copies:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway
Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of Norway
Ukrainian associations in the Kingdom of Norway

Subject: Why will, very soon, the sanctioned ship Shtandart represent Russian interests in Norway?

23 July 2025

Dear Sir/Madam,

According to its programme, the sanctioned Russian ship Shtandart  MMSI 518999255 plans to call in Norway at

  • Kristiansand, from 30 July to 1 August 2025;
  • and Sandefjord from 15 to 17 August 2025.

We have read the open letter sent to you by Vladimir Martus, the captain and hidden owner of the Russian ship, regarding the Norwegian port sanctions regime.

We note that this letter falls far short of the objective it claims to have set itself, which is to provide clarification. In fact, it creates confusion.

That’s why we are going to present you with some important facts that have been glossed over. We will address the anachronisms in Vladimir Martus’s account by providing a clear timeline of events divided into three distinct periods:

  • before 24 February 2022 (launch of the full-scale invasion);
  • between 24 February 2022 and 24 June 2024 (the European Council’s clarification)
  • and after 24 June 2024.

We will also highlight elements of misinformation and expose the scheme devised to incorporate the Shtandart into the Russian shadow fleet.

I sincerely apologise for the length of this text. However, in a case like this, it is not possible to be satisfied with unfounded allegations. We must rely on documented, verifiable facts. I can also send you a copy of my passport if you wish so.

  1. Registration and Jurisdiction
  2. Ownership and Management
  3. History and Legal Context
  4. Cultural Mission and Peaceful Role
  5. Legal Standing and Interpretative Space 

Conclusion
Attachment
On the same topic

1. Registration and Jurisdiction

The change from a Russian flag to a Cook Islands flag of convenience on June 6, 2024, was solely intended to bypass sanctions. As will be explained below, the Shtandart MMSI 518999255, whose captain is Russian, is still a Russian ship. It is owned by a Russian citizen and managed by a Russian company. It works for Russian interests.

2. Ownership and Management

Based on the ownership transfer validation that we could not verify, it seems that the Shtandart‘s property has been transferred from ‘Shtandart Project’. This company is domiciled in Saint Petersburg. Vladimir Martus owns more than 60% of its shares. According to the certificate of registration, the new “owner” of the Shtandart is Maria (Mariia) Martus. She is a Russian citizen and Vladimir Martus’s daughter. She studied in Helsinki and subsequently obtained a Finnish passport. She is a nominee owner who is used to circumvent sanctions.

We have three questions: First, was this « purchase » by a « Finnish citizen » of a boat belonging to a company domiciled in Saint Petersburg signed in La Rochelle, France? Do European sanctions allow a Finnish citizen to “purchase” a Russian vessel? Finally, is this transaction legal?

According to the attached attestation, the managing owner of the Shtandart is a “German” commercial company, « Martus TV GmbH ». The Russian citizen Vladimir Martus owns 80% of “Martus TV GmbH”. The remaining 20% of the shares belong to another Russian citizen, Irina Ermakova. Ermakova is Vladimir Martus’s wife. Vladimir Martus is the president and managing director of « Martus TV GmbH ». « Martus TV GmbH » is, then, a 100% Russian company with no activity, employees, or assets in Germany except a mailbox. It should be noted that in this document, Vladimir Martus claims to be a dual national: Russian and Ukrainian. In fact, he is only a Russian citizen.

Consequently, the de facto owner of the private yacht Shtandart MMSI 518999255 is the Russian citizen Vladimir Martus, the skipper of the ship. Depending on the context and interlocutors, Martus can introduce himself as the owner of the Shtandart. He can also pretend that the owner is a “Finnish citizen” when it is convenient for him.

Vladimir Martus obtained a German residency permit because he owns, presides over, and manages « Martus TV GmbH, » which is domiciled in a Hamburg post office box. However, he doesn’t live there. He lives on board the Shtandart. He uses an address in La Rochelle, France,  where the Shtandart has been based for more than three years, in violation of Article 3ea of EU Regulation No. 833/2014.

Vladimir MARTUS
Commandant du navire école SHTANDART
Réplique historique du Tsar Pierre 1er LE GRAND
Capt Vladimir MARTUS c/o Patrice BERNIER
Bureau du port
1 Rue de l’Armide,
17000 La Rochelle, France

This is thanks to the Russian network of influence within the French state apparatus and thanks to local accomplices, such as Jean-François Fountaine, the former mayor and shipbuilder who exports yachts to Russia; Brice Blondel, the Charente-Maritime prefect and former head of Emmanuel Macron’s office; Patrice Bernier, the dockmaster for the La Rochelle marina; and Michel Balique, the president of the « Amis des Grands Voiliers – Sail Training Association France. »

3.1. The Shtandart, a symbol of Saint Petersburg until 2007

The construction of the Shtandart was supported by the Saint Petersburg municipality. The mayor at the time was Anatoly Sobchak, who had Vladimir Putin as his close advisor on international affairs. It is rumoured that Vladimir Putin is the godfather of Ksenia Sobchak, Anatoly Sobchak’s daughter. Between 1999 and 2007, the Shtandart was an emblem of Saint Petersburg, as reported by RIA Novosti and other Russian media outlets. The ship was involved in all major public events of Saint Petersburg. During this period, the Shtandart was closely associated with the Saint Petersburg governor, Valentina Matviyenko. It is said that she belongs to the small circle of people around Vladimir Putin. Since September 2011, she has been the Chairwoman of the Federation Council.

3.2. The flight from Saint Petersburg and the reasons for not returning, from 2007 to 2022

In 2007, Vladimir Martus, confident in his krysha, violated safety regulations and got into a fight with Dmitry Atlashkin, the Head of the North-West Department of State Marine and River Supervision at the Ministry for Transport. As a result, the Shtandart was detained in port.

Thanks to its krysha, in 2009 the Shtandart was permitted to travel, without a crew, to Kotka in Finland, being towed by a tugboat to undergo safety improvements. However, once in Kotka, the Shtandart‘s crew were brought on board and Vladimir Martus decided to sail to Naryan-Mar, near Arkhangelsk, to perform at a festival the Shtandart had been contracted to play at. Unfortunately, inspectors from Dmitry Atlashkin’s department were waiting there. The Shtandart escaped to Europe and never returned.

In July 2020, however, Vladimir Martus announced on Instagram, Facebook, VK, on his website and in Russian newspapers that the dispute had been resolved. Since then, the Shtandart has been able to return to Saint Petersburg freely. All legal claims have been dropped.

The litigation was resolved because the Russian Geographical Society and the Russian Presidential Administration chartered the Shtandart for a diplomatic mission to Greece to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the victory in the Battle of Chesma. Originally scheduled for September–October 2020, the expedition was postponed to 2021 due to the pandemic.

Since then, the Shtandart has not returned to Russia because European maritime festivals are profitable, and the Neva River is frozen for almost four months of the year, which is not conducive to business. We suspect that the Shtandart may be carrying out other missions in Western countries, as evidenced by a recent press release from the Russian Consulate General in Aberdeen.

See also:

3.3. The truth about Spanish and French ‘authorisations’ between 16 April 2022 and 24 June 2024.

The Shtandart received just one official Spanish authorisation. It was for Pasaia (Pasajes) in May 2022. This authorisation was based on the fake allegation that Emmanuel Macron had officially agreed to stopovers in French ports. We debunked this claim. Consequently, the Shtandart was prohibited from attending the ‘Ruta Iacobus Maris’ in Vigo in July 2022.

There was never any official authorisation for stopovers in France. Only informal pass-throughs were permitted, and these should not have been made public. Since their publication by Martus and his lawyers, the compromised officials have remained silent. This is evidence that Vladimir Martus has accomplices within the French state apparatus. The most important of these is Éric Turquet de Beauregard, head of the legal department at the Secretariat General for the Sea (SGMer). He is one of the officials who forced a false version of the sanctions and pressured the departmental prefects not to apply EU regulations to the Shtandart.

The European Council voted an amendment on 24 June 2024 via CFSP Decision No. 2024/1744, which was enacted in Regulation No. 2024/1745, to stop this fallacious rewriting of EU regulation. It clarifies that replicas of historical ships are subject to EU sanctions.

 ..it is appropriate to clarify the scope of the port access ban for Russian-flagged vessels..

(13) CFSP Decision No. 2024/1744

(7) Article 3ea is amended as follows:
…
(b) in paragraph 3, point (a) is replaced by the following:
‘(a) a ship falling within the scope of the relevant international conventions, including replicas of historical ships;’..

Regulation No. 2024/1745

However, prior to 24 June 2024, the Shtandart was already banned from visiting certain ports or taking part in maritime festivals. These included Sète, Bordeaux, Vigo, La Coruña, Lorient, Granville, Brest, Castellón, Dénia, Paimpol…

3.4. From 24 June 2024, enforcement of port sanctions and court decisions, all unfavourable to the sanctioned Russian ship Shtandart

After 24 June 2024, French prefects issued orders to enforce the EU regulation in the departments of Finistère (Brest), Côtes d’Armor (Saint-Brieuc), Ille-et-Vilaine (Rennes), Manche (Saint-Lô). The ban applies to all ports in these departments. Ultimately, the Shtandart fraud continues to occur only in Morbihan (Vannes) and Charente-Maritime (La Rochelle) in France. Our whistleblower collective is investigating these prefects for compromising with Russian interests.

The Shtandart challenged the Finistère prefect’s order in the Rennes Administrative Court. It lost on 11 July 2024. The Shtandart then appealed against the decision of the Rennes court in the French Supreme Court (Conseil d’État). It lost on 18 November 2024. What follows was written by Vladimir Martus to lure the Norwegian authorities.

“We acknowledge that certain port authorities, such as in Brest, may have adopted alternative legal interpretations. These have been formally challenged in both the French Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice. We await final rulings.”

Vladimir Martus letter to Norwegian Directorate for Export Control and Sanctions

Vladimir Martus’s only argument is that the 24 June 2024 amendment was an ‘extension’ that occurred after the Shtandart changed its flag. He claims that applying sanctions to the Russian ship is therefore ‘not legally grounded’, as this would imply “retroactivity ». It is clear to everyone that this is ridiculous because the amendment was a CLARIFICATION not an ‘extension’. However, thanks to his control over the media, Vladimir Martus is confident in his ability to promote an alternative reality and pressure the authorities.

4. Cultural Mission and Peaceful Role

4.1. Vladimir Martus: “The vessel has never displayed Russian state symbols”

After 24 February 2022, prior to its change of country of registration on 6 June 2024, the Shtandart systematically flew the Russian national flag, the Russian imperial flag, and the Russian war flame. After this date, alongside the flag of the Cook Islands, it continued to fly the Russian war flame occasionally and the Russian imperial flag consistently.

Shandart, imperial flag
Shandart sailing sailing under imperial flag

Russian imperial flag : « Gulf of Morbihan Week 2025 » (May 26 to June 1, 2025)

It is also possible to check the Shtandart’s profiles on Marine Traffic and Vessel Finder. Although these accounts were created after the Shtandart was registered in the Cook Islands, the ship is depicted flying the Russian national flag, the Russian imperial flag and the Russian war flame.

4.2. Vladimir Martus: “(Shtandart‘s) leadership and crew have consistently condemned the aggression of the Russian state, both in 2014 and in 2022”.

Since 2014, Martus has prohibited any discussion of politics on board the Shtandart. In Russia, ‘not talking about politics’ has a different meaning to that in Western countries. It simply means not making negative comments about the Russian government.

In 2014, there was no evidence that the Shtandart or Vladimir Martus had condemned the annexation of Crimea or the start of the Russian proxy war in Donbass. In fact, Martus celebrated the boarding, by Russian sailors, of the Khersones, a Ukrainian tall ship stolen during the annexation of Crimea. When questioned in Brest on 16 July 2024 about Crimea’s ownership, Martus answered, ‘Crimea belongs to those who live there’, despite ten years of Russification, ethnic cleansing, Tatar persecution, the exodus of discriminated Ukrainians, and the transfer of a Russian population to Crimea. This is another version of Tsar Nicholas I’s words: ‘Where the Russian flag is raised, it should never be lowered’. This is also similar to what Vladimir Putin proclaimed on 20 June 2025: ‘Wherever a Russian soldier sets foot, that’s ours’.

Regarding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine from 24 February 2022, Martus claims to be against the war and in favour of peace. However, this is no different to the propaganda coming out of Moscow. There, propaganda agencies claim to oppose a war launched by ‘Ukrainian Nazis’ and NATO. They also support “peace”, but only on Russian terms. Vladimir Martus sometimes uses a smokescreen, stating that he cannot speak out against the Russian war in order to protect his family. However, he claims to have no further links with Russia and says he has been living in Germany for 14 years.

4.3. Vladimir Martus: “TS SHTANDART remains a unique symbol of peace, youth development, and international friendship”.

In every conflict, there are collaborators. It’s nothing new. But in the case of the Shtandart, it might be even simpler. The Shtandart’s crew people we met in Brest, on 16 July 2024, are pleased to be under the dominance of a guru, Vladimir Martus. They don’t think for themselves. These worshippers repeat the language elements prepared by Martus. After two or three sentences, however, they get lost. They start repeating Moscow’s anti-Western and Ukrainian-phobic rhetoric. The Shtandart is a formidable Russification machine.

The Shtandart never officially had the status of a training ship. However, until 2007, it did carry out a similar assignment for the Saint Petersburg Political Committee for Youth. Its aim was to promote Russian patriotism. 

Учебные плавания на фрегате « Штандарт » входят в программу « Школа жизни – паруса Истории », поддержанную комитетом по молодежной политике и связям с общественными организациями администрации Санкт-Петербурга.
Training voyages on the frigate ‘Sthandart’ are part of the programme ‘School of Life – Sails of History’ supported by the political committee for Youth and Relations with Public Organisations of St. Petersburg Administration.

RIA Novosti, 25/02/2004 – В Петербурге будет объявлен конкурс по отбору участников плавания « Штандарта »

Since 2007, the Shtandart has acted in accordance with its actual status as a privately owned yacht, paid for attending maritime events. Between festivals, the Shtandart carries paying passengers, who are called ‘trainees’, in order to bypass the SOLAS convention.

4.4. Vladimir Martus: “The general public in ports such as Dublin, Cherbourg, and Brest have warmly welcomed her”

a) Outrage in Spain

Spain should be mentioned first. On 24 July 2024, the maritime authorities formally communicated a ban on all their ports to the Shtandart.

Three days later, the sanctioned Russian ship was banned from Spanish territorial waters due to its numerous infractions.

b) Dublin, Cherbourg, and Brest, what welcome ?

Vladimir Martus writes that he was warmly welcomed in ports such as Dublin, Cherbourg and Brest. We will not list all the flash mobs and demonstrations held to denounce the Shtandart‘s fraud against the sanctions in France, Ukraine and Spain. We will focus on the cities he mentioned.

The Shtandart‘s last unannounced stopover in Cherbourg on 21 May 2024 was hidden. It lasted just a few hours. There is no evidence of a warm welcome.

The Shtandart attempted an unannounced stopover in Brest on 1 June 2024. Ukrainian activists alerted the authorities. The only ‘welcome’  the sanctioned Russian ship got was an anti-Shtandart demonstration and the stopover was forbidden by the maritime authorities. On 7 July 2024, the first French Préfectoral order was issued against the Shtandart. The Russian ship was banned from all ports in the Finistère department, including Brest, where it had been scheduled to participate in a major maritime festival. However, on 11 July 2024, the Shtandart attempted to enter the roadstead of Brest. It was stopped by a French Navy patrol boat. Despite an intensive media campaign and « humanitarian » blackmail, Vladimir Martus could not bypass this prohibition.

After it turned off its AIS (Automatic Identification System) on 6 July 2025, the Shtandart’s unannounced stopover in Dublin was prohibited and enforced by the Irish Coastguard. Instead, the Shtandart moored in Killiney Bay on 7 and 8 July 2025, under the strict control of Ukrainian activists and the Irish Coastguard. Then, on 9 July 2024 at 00:00 UTC, the Russian ship performed an unannounced and unauthorised night stopover in the small port of Clogherhead. The Irish government has taken this seriously. An investigation is underway.

It should be noted that, when talking to the media, Vladimir Martus portrays himself and the Shtandart as victims of an unjust ban from all European ports. However, when he writes to the authorities, he claims that his ship is authorised everywhere except for minor exceptions.

c) Other incidents during the Shtandart’s summer tour until 22 July 2025.

Regarding the Shtandart’s summer tour in 2025, it should be noted that the sanctioned Russian ship was scheduled to depart from Saint-Malo on 2 July 2024, following opposition from the Jersey government to a stopover in its harbours. However, access to all ports in the Ille-et-Vilaine department, including Saint-Malo, was forbidden by the prefect. Consequently, the Russian ship attempted to enter the ports in the neighbouring Côtes d’Armor department. This was also forbidden by the prefect. Ultimately, the Shtandart could only moor off the small marina in Saint-Cast-le-Guildo, from where it left for Falmouth, though it did not stop there.

In the UK, the Shtandart was prohibited to access all ports, including Aberdeen where it planned to attend the Tall Ship Races without prior authorisation from maritime authorities. It did, however, make an unauthorised stopover in Inverie on 13 and 14 July. Inverie is a small, isolated village on the western coast of Scotland, not connected to the UK road system. After switching off its AIS (Automatic Identification System) again, the Shtandart attempted to make another stopover at Scapa Pier in the Orkney Islands on 17 July 2025. The Russian ship was expelled by the coastguard.

We are aware that national authorities must act in accordance with their own interpretations of sanction regulations. However, we believe that in this specific case, the spirit and letter of Norwegian and EU sanction policy both support an exemption for the TS SHTANDART.

Vladimir Martus letter to Norwegian Directorate for Export Control and Sanctions

Martus, a Russian citizen, dares to suggest that the authorities of the country he is visiting are permitted by him to act in accordance with their INTERPRETATION of the law. This is either a deliberate provocation or an expression of deep contempt. These Western authorities are not Russian; they enforce their regulations according to the rule of law. Furthermore, the vatnik attempts to explain the « spirit of the sanctions policy » to the host authorities. It’s beyond comprehension. The fifth round of restrictive measures was taken to sanction Russia for the Bucha massacre, as stated by the European Council. It’s clear. It cannot be rewritten by Russian revisionists.

What follows is even more unacceptable. Vladimir Martus states, ‘All parties retain the right to uphold their interpretation without violating the law’. In other words, the Russian fraudster is placing himself on an equal footing with the Norway authorities. He reserves the right to act as he wishes, according to his « interpretation » of the law or his presentation of the « spirit of the sanctions policy ». This outlaw and his gopniks should be firmly reminded that Norway is neither Russia nor a Ukrainian territory occupied by the Russian army.

Conclusion

To argue that the Shtandart would no longer be Russian because it is flying a flag of convenience, is owned by a Finnish citizen and is managed by a German company is far from reality. This is merely window dressing. What we have here is an arrangement designed to circumvent sanctions for the benefit of Russian private and political interests.

Thank you for taking the time to read this text to the end. If your services have any questions I will be happy to answer them in writing or by WhatsApp. Similarly, I am at the disposal of the Norwegian intelligence services to share with them any or all of the thick documentation we have accumulated over the last three years on the outlaw Martus and on the ship Shtandart, ambassador of Russian imperialist propaganda.

Sincerely yours,

Bernard Grua, Nantes, Brittany, France
Former French Navy Officer
Spokesperson

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No Shtandart In Europe
Email: noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
Website: https://bit.ly/No-Shtandart
Facebook: groups/noshtandartineurope
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On the same topic

A debunking of the main false allegations produced by the sanctioned Russian ship « Shtandart »

For more than three years, the fictional story of the Russian ship Shtandart, which was designed to circumvent sanctions imposed as a result of Russia’s criminal aggression against Ukraine, has been protean. It is constantly fed to maximise confusion. Here, we will focus on debunking the most commonly used misinformation from the summer of 2025.
  1. ‘The Shtandart doesn’t represent Russia.’
  2. ‘The Shtandart doesn’t fly the Russian flag’.
  3. ‘The Shtandart is owned by a Finn and operated by a German company.’
  4. ‘An international team of sailing enthusiasts’
  5. ‘He left the country over a decade ago, and from what I hear, not even on good terms.’
  6. ‘The Shtandart is a training vessel.’

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On the same topic

‘The Shtandart doesn’t represent Russia.’

The Greek diplomatic mission performed by the Shtandart in October 2021 was organised by the Russian embassy in Greece. It was conducted under the auspices of Vladimir Putin and financed by the grant fund of the presidential administration — Putin’s personal fund.

In summer 2024, hundreds of articles were published by propaganda outlets and Russian newspapers. The Shtandart was referred to as the ‘Russian ship’ or the ‘Russian frigate’, even after the change of registration country from Russia to the Cook Islands on 6 June 2024.

Last but not least, the press release from the Russian Consulate in Edinburgh published by TASS makes clear to everyone that this extraordinary, rough and undiplomatic statement is a violent positiontaking in favour of a Russian asset.

‘The Shtandart doesn’t fly the Russian flag’.

The Shtandart continues to fly frequently a large Russian imperial flag on top of its main mast.

Shandart, imperial flag
Shandart sailing sailing under imperial flag

Russian imperial flag : « Gulf of Morbihan Week 2025 » (May 26 to June 1, 2025)

It is also possible to check the Shtandart’s profiles on Marine Traffic and Vessel Finder. Although these accounts were created after the Shtandart was registered in the Cook Islands, they show the ship flying the Russian national flag, the Russian imperial flag and the Russian war flag.

‘The Shtandart is owned by a Finn and operated by a German company.’

In fact, the official Shtandart property was transferred from the Saint Petersburg-based company ‘Shtandart Project’ to Mariia Martus in 2024. This young daughter of Vladimir Martus is a Russian citizen. She studied in Helsinki and, then, obtained a Finnish passport.

The ‘German’ company ‘Martus TV GmbH’ is registered in Hamburg at a PO Box address. Vladimir Martus, a Russian citizen, owns 80% of its shares. The remaining 20% of shares are held by another Russian citizen, Irina Ermakova, who is Vladimir Martus’s wife. According to Martus’s own declaration (attached below), ‘Martus TV GmbH’ is the « managing owner » of the Shtandart. Vladimir Martus is also the director of  ‘Martus TV GmbH’. Now you understand who is actually the de facto Russian owner of the private yacht Shtandart. 

‘An international team of sailing enthusiasts’

In every conflict, there are collaborators. It’s nothing new. But in the case of the Shtandart, it might be even simpler. The young people I met in Brest, on 16 July 2024, are losers in real life. They are pleased to be under the dominance of their guru, Vladimir Martus. They don’t think for themselves. These brainwashed worshippers repeat the language elements prepared by Martus. After two or three sentences, however, they get lost. They start repeating Moscow’s anti-Western and Ukrainian-phobic rhetoric. The Shtandart is a formidable Russification machine.

‘He left the country over a decade ago, and from what I hear, not even on good terms.’

In 2007, Vladimir Martus violated Russian security regulations. He violated them again in 2009. That’s why he fled abroad. However, Martus proclaimed on Instagram, VK, Facebook, the Shtandart website and Russian media in July 2020 that everything had been resolved.

    From 2007 to 2022, Martus does not  appear as an opponent but as a Russian public figure.

    Martus diplomatic mission in Greece proves that he is on very good terms with the Russian authorities. This is evident, for example, in the RT documentary produced in 2014. 

    After 2020, the Shtandart could return to Russia. However, Martus found it more lucrative to perform at European festivals. Don’t forget that the Neva river is frozen for more than four months of the year. This is not conducive to business, not to mention the other missions he could be in charge of in western Europe. Nevertheless, we have evidence that Martus was in Saint Petersburg between the beginning of January and February 2022, i.e. a few days before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

    Кораблик встал на межсезонный ремонт в греческом городе Каристос. А я приехал домой – трудно поверить, но – первый раз за 12 лет.
    Телефон тот же что и был, я здесь до середины февраля.

    😜
    VK 17/01/2022 – https://vk.com/wall354135_3640

    The ship is in the off-season repair in the Greek town of Karystos. And I came home – hard to believe, but – for the first time in 12 years.
    Phone is the same as it was, I’m here until mid-February.

    VK 17/01/2022 – https://vk.com/wall354135_3640

    ‘The Shtandart is a training vessel.’

    The Shtandart never officially had the status of a training ship. However, until 2007, it did carry out a similar assignment for the Saint Petersburg Political Committee for Youth. Its aim was to promote Russian patriotism. 

    Учебные плавания на фрегате « Штандарт » входят в программу « Школа жизни – паруса Истории », поддержанную комитетом по молодежной политике и связям с общественными организациями администрации Санкт-Петербурга.

    Training voyages on the frigate ‘Standart’ are part of the programme ‘School of Life – Sails of History’ supported by the political committee for Youth and Relations with Public Organisations of St. Petersburg Administration.

    RIA Novosti, 25/02/2004 – В Петербурге будет объявлен конкурс по отбору участников плавания « Штандарта »

    Since then, the Shtandart has acted in accordance with its actual status as a privately owned yacht, paid for attending maritime events. Between festivals, the Shtandart carries paying passengers, who are called ‘trainees’, in order to bypass the SOLAS convention.

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    Email: noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
    Website: https://bit.ly/No-Shtandart
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    « No Shtandart in Europe » répond à la lettre du ministère britannique des transports concernant le navire russe sous sanctions « Shtandart ».

    This letter in English

    A l’attention de : Ministère des transports du Royaume-Uni

    Copies :

    • Ambassade d’Ukraine au Royaume-Uni
    • Ambassade d’Ukraine en France
    • HM Coastguard
    • M. Gabriel Attal, Président du groupe d’amitié France-Ukraine à l’Assemblée nationale française
    • Ukrainian Aberdeen
    • Union des Ukrainiens de France

    Objet : Ref TO-00044152, le collectif lanceur d’alertes « No Shtandart in Europe » répond à la lettre du ministère britannique des transports concernant le navire russe sous sanctions « Shtandart ».

    19 juillet 2025

    Chère Madame, Cher Monsieur,

    Au nom du collectif « No Shtandart in Europe », je tiens à vous remercier pour votre lettre aimable et détaillée du 18 juillet 2025, qui est jointe à ce message. Elle concerne le navire russe sous sanctions Shtandart (MMSI : 518999255), qui navigue sous le pavillon de complaisance des îles Cook depuis le 6 juin 2024.

    L’Ukraine est notre ligne de front commune contre la barbarie la plus abjecte. Votre correspondance démontre la détermination du Royaume-Uni à soutenir résolument et sans ambiguïté ce pays victime de l’invasion criminelle et meurtrière de la Russie.

    Vous mentionnez notamment le rôle crucial des autorités portuaires britanniques dans l’application des sanctions portuaires. Nous tenons à souligner que nous avons toujours reçu un accueil courtois, bienveillant et professionnel de la part des Harbour Masters et des HM Coastguard avec lesquels nous avons été en contact.

    En ce qui concerne la navigation du Shtandart à partir de la côte nord de la Bretagne, où il n’avait pas le droit d’accoster, nous pouvons rapporter ce que nous avons observé. Le navire russe n’a pas accédé à Falmouth ni à l‘île de Man. Il semble avoir fait une tentative non-annoncée et infructueuse d’entrer dans les îles Scilly le 4 juillet 2025.

    Le Shtandart a fait une escale inopinée et probablement illégale à Inverie les 13 et 14 juillet 2025. Il ne semble pas que les autorités l’aient encore sanctionné pour cela. Vous trouverez plus d’informations sur cette infraction dans notre document détaillé.

    Le Shtandart a été explicitement informé qu’il lui était interdit d’accoster à Aberdeen et de participer aux Tall Ships Races.

    Le 17 juillet 2025, le Shtandart a déconnecté son AIS (Automatic Identification System) avec, apparemment, l’intention d’accoster à Scapa Pier dans les îles Orcades.

    Le navire russe a été expulsé des îles Orcades par les garde-côtes.

    Le communiqué de presse publié par le consul général de Russie en Ecosse et repris par l’agence de propagande TASS témoigne de l’intérêt du gouvernement russe pour la présence du Shtandart dans les ports des pays occidentaux, le long de leurs côtes et dans leurs eaux territoriales.

    Les services de renseignement de nos pays respectifs devraient en prendre note. Le texte du consul russe est plein de rage. Il est très peu diplomatique et extrêmement agressif. Il est explicitement conflictuel et provocateur, et il insulte les citoyens du Royaume-Uni. En ce qui concerne la population russe, tant en Russie qu’en Grande-Bretagne, les imprécations du consul sont clairement destinée à y promouvoir la haine des Britanniques, voire pire.

    Enfin, la prose consulaire russe révèle la véritable mission du Shtandart, au-delà de la fiction trompeuse et sirupeuse promue par son capitaine et propriétaire caché, Vladimir Martus.

    Nous restons à votre disposition, ainsi qu’à celle des services de renseignement britanniques, pour fournir tout ou partie des documents que nous avons recueillis dans cette affaire d’ingérence russe pour le moins inhabituelle.

    Nous tenons également à souligner que nous attendons de l’appareil d’Etat français qu’il fasse preuve du même professionnalisme et de la même détermination que son homologue britannique dans l’affaire Shtandart.

    Je vous prie d’agréer, Chère Madame, Cher Monsieur, l’expression de mes salutations distingués.

    Bernard Grua, Nantes, Bretagne, France
    Ancien officier de Marine
    Porte-parole

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    Email: noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
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    Standart, lettre du 18 juillet 2025 du ministère transports du Royaume-Uni page une
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    Sur le même sujet :

    Alert! Potential illegal stopover of Russian ship « Shtandart » at Scapa Pier, Orkney Islands, 17 july 2025

    To: Orkney harbours and HM Coastguard

    Re: Alert! Potential illegal stopover of Russian ship Shtandart (MMSI: 518999255) at Scapa Pier, Orkney Islands

    7 July, 13:04 UTC

    Dear Sir/Madam,

    The Russian vessel Shtandart (MMSI: 518999255), which has been sailing under the flag of convenience of the Cook Islands since 6 June 2024, disconnected its AIS five hours ago (17 July 2025, 07:39 UTC, 08:39 UK time) after entering Scapa Bay in the Orkney Islands.

    The Russian vessel Shtandart (MMSI: 518999255), sails under the flag of convenience of the Cook Islands
    The Russian vessel Shtandart (MMSI: 518999255), disconnected its AIS five hours ago (17 July 2025, 07:39 UTC, 08:39 UK time) after entering Scapa Bay
    The Shtandart is currently en route to Aberdeen, where it is banned from entering due to Russian sanctions, in order to join the Tall Ship Races, in which it is forbidden to participate.

    It is suspected that the aim is to make an illegal landing at Scapa Pier, as happened at Clogherhead in Ireland and Inverie in Scotland.

    shtandart is suspected to make an illegal landing at Scapa Pier, as happened at Clogherhead in Ireland and Inverie in Scotland

    If the disconnection of the AIS and this second illegal stopover in UK waters were to be confirmed, this could result in a ban on the Shtandart in British territorial waters, as occurred in Spain on 27 July 2024.

    Please do not hesitate to contact us should you require any further information.

    Yours sincerely,

    Bernard Grua

    Logo No Shtandart In Europe

    No Shtandart In Europe
    Email: noshtandartineurope@gmail.com
    Website: https://bit.ly/No-Shtandart
    Facebook: groups/noshtandartineurope
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