Russian frigate Shtandart: culture as a ground for sanctions?

When Culture Becomes a Sanction: The Case of the Frigate Shtandart and the Limits of Legal Protection
In a statement published on 5 May 2025 on its website, “When culture becomes a sanction… the limits of legal protection” [0], Shtandart raises a question that has now become central: can culture be invoked as a principle of neutrality in the face of war and sanctions?

Texte en français

Portrayed as a maritime and educational replica, the vessel has become the subject of administrative, legal, and political controversies with very concrete effects. The arguments it develops have already been discussed in several publications, which here make it possible to assess the use of cultural narratives for political purposes.

But the Shtandart text is not limited to its own defence: it offers an interpretation of the interplay between culture, politics, and sanctions that calls for discussion.

[0] Shtandart, When Culture Becomes a Sanction: The Case of the Frigate Shtandart and the Limits of Legal Protection, shtandart.eu, 5 May 2025


I. The implicit thesis of the Shtandart text

The actual substance of the Shtandart (MMSI 518999255) text only becomes apparent after careful reading, even though its title already announces its general meaning.

The replica of Peter the Great’s frigate is portrayed as a historical and educational object which, due to its nature, should be preserved and kept outside political confrontations and sanctions regimes. It is also recalled that “the protection of cultural heritage, particularly in times of conflict, is a widely recognised principle.”

Shtandart advances another argument for exclusion from the scope of EU restrictive measures. “It is not a military vessel, does not perform state functions, and carries no political mandate.”

The restrictions targeting the vessel would therefore not be the normal result of the application of EU regulations, but the product of a distorted interpretation under the effect of activist and reputational pressure.

The document refers to a “broader flexibilisation of law”. It suggests that some administrative authorities may have preferred to ban the vessel not because of applicable legal criteria, but out of fear of political and media risk linked to the war in Ukraine and the campaigns conducted against Shtandart.

It would thus have been targeted precisely because of its historical vocation. The title, “When culture becomes a sanction…”, is thereby confirmed.

In summary, Shtandart would be a heritage vessel specifically targeted, and the victim of a weakening of the rule of law in a context of conflict.

The examination of the grounds invoked for the application of restrictive measures to this vessel cannot be limited to their presentation by the party concerned. It requires a broader interrogation of the relationship between culture and politics as analysed in studies of soft power.


 II. The myth of cultural neutrality

The core of the argument consists in marketing Shtandart as a purely historical and educational project strictly separated from contemporary political dimensions. However, these are elements of discourse identified in the literature on Russian soft power. Edward Said notes that:

 “Culture is never innocent; it is always involved in relations of power.”

This dichotomy has also been questioned in a Diploweb publication on hybrid influence dynamics related to this vessel [1].

The issue is not only the nature of Peter the Great’s frigate replica, but the imperial imaginaries it conveys, the symbolic representations it shapes, and its effects in the public sphere.

With the war in Ukraine, Shtandart cannot therefore be reduced to a neutral vehicle of transmission.

While the links between culture and politics are widely acknowledged, some authors and analyses go further, viewing Russian culture as a structuring factor in the conflict in Ukraine.

[1] Bernard Grua, “Russia. From soft power to hybrid warfare: case study of Russian influence in Europe (the Shtandart),” Diploweb, 25 November 2025.


III. Russian culture as a matrix of power politics

In times of conflict, culture is often interpreted through the lens of soft power and hybrid warfare. But for some, it must be understood more structurally, as a matrix of external projection.

This idea has been articulated particularly explicitly by Timothy Snyder:

 “The invocation of Russian history and culture is used to justify military aggression and expansionism, giving war a moral veneer.”

The conclusions of the study devoted to “Great Russian Culture” [2] lead to similar findings. The purpose of that article was not to deny the existence or richness of Russian culture, but to show that certain historical and cultural references can be exploited as tools of geopolitical legitimisation.

This reading remains relatively absent from French debate, but it cannot be ignored without risking overlooking a major dimension of the Shtandart case, as perceived in neighbouring countries of Russia.

For several centuries, Russian culture has contributed to a narrative of civilisational superiority, which partly feeds the ongoing conflict.

Invoking it as proof of political innocence is therefore no longer sustainable. In several Eastern European countries, it is even understood as contrary to the objective pursued by Shtandart’s communication strategy.

The question is therefore not whether this vessel is a cultural asset—it undeniably is—but to acknowledge that it remains a political object embedded in a geopolitical confrontation and a struggle over representations.

If the cultural dimension of Shtandart appears more complex than presented in public debate, its treatment nonetheless falls within a European legal framework based on clearly defined criteria.

[2] Bernard Grua, “The ‘great Russian culture’, a matrix of supremacism at the origin of the war in Ukraine” , bernardgrua.net, 26 October 2025.


 IV. EU sanctions: neither an isolated case nor an administrative misunderstanding

The vessel argues that the restrictions targeting it result from a misunderstanding of its cultural vocation, or even from an administrative-legal drift.

This explanation does not withstand examination of the decisions concerning it. These measures fall within the EU sanctions programme adopted in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This regime is defined in Article 3ea of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. Its application has been confirmed on several occasions, notably by the order of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 22 August 2025.

Here, the cultural qualification of Shtandart, as well as the claimed political neutrality, constitutes neither an exemption nor a relevant factor in these measures. Such parameters simply do not enter into the equation, contrary to what is argued.

The determining criterion lies elsewhere. EU texts are based on objective indicators linked to flag and registration. This practice is consistent across the Union and applies to all vessels concerned, without derogation based on any symbolic or traditional status. Shtandart therefore belongs to a group comprising more than 4,000 vessels flying the Russian flag as of 24 February 2022, regardless of ownership or use. These vessels have been banned from EU ports since 16 April 2022.

Their identification by port authorities relies on European maritime monitoring and information systems, notably those of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).

While the application of EU rules to Shtandart is broadly consistent, a particular case reveals a more “flexible” implementation, favourable to the vessel, in which the cultural argument was mobilised for justificatory purposes.


V. From Shtandart’s discourse to administrative leniency

The claims examined above have not remained theoretical. They have translated into concrete practice in a French Atlantic port.

A Desk Russie article focuses on La Rochelle [3], which served as Shtandart’s base port for more than three years. It highlights, at the very least, accommodating arrangements and interpretative “flexibility” in the application of the rules. However, such a situation is an exception compared with the practice of other EU ports.

This deviation in La Rochelle ultimately came to an end thanks to the inter-prefectoral order of 5 March 2026, adopted by the French maritime prefects (Channel–North Sea, Atlantic, Mediterranean). This order renders the arguments advanced by Shtandart moot.

Beyond administrative practices and legal controversies, Shtandart’s position is distinguished by its structure and by the purpose it pursues.

[3] Bernard Grua, When the Russian vessel Shtandart and La Rochelle defy EU sanctions, Desk-Russie, 28 September 2025.


 VI. A well-known Russian rhetoric

The core of the narrative reproduces discourse elements classically used by Russia. The remainder reflects the construction of an alternative reality.

The purpose of Shtandart’s argument raises questions.

It appears difficult to mobilise in an appeal against the administration or in court, given the unsubstantiated accusations it contains. There is nothing indicating that it would be capable of challenging the inter-prefectoral order of 5 March 2026.

Its technocratic formulation and abstract content are not suited to regional or national media, nor to social networks where Shtandart’s supporters usually express themselves.

Russian media, attentive to the campaign led by Shtandart against sanctions, could therefore constitute one of its outlets, within a broader perspective of contestation of national or European institutions.

Bernard Grua


Summary

Shtandart argues that it was targeted by sanctions not despite its cultural dimension, but precisely because of it. The vessel claims that the port bans directed against it result from a “flexible” interpretation of the law in the context of the war in Ukraine and the campaigns conducted by its opponents. This argument must be analysed in light of Russia’s political uses of culture and the applicable European legal framework.



Original text from Shtandart

When Culture Becomes a Sanction: The Case of the Frigate Shtandart and the Limits of Legal Protection

The story of the frigate Shtandart is not merely a private dispute around a single vessel. It is a revealing case study of how, in times of geopolitical crisis, the very logic of law shifts — and how cultural projects can suddenly become exposed to risk.

A closer look at this case leads to three uncomfortable but important conclusions: culture is not shielded from politics; symbols can outweigh substance; and the law is far more flexible than we tend to believe.

A Cultural Object That Ceased to Be “Just Culture”

Formally, the Shtandart is a historical replica — an educational and cultural initiative. It is not a military vessel, does not perform state functions, and carries no political mandate.

Yet within the framework of EU sanctions policy, this proved irrelevant.

The key shift occurred in the criteria of assessment: the question changed from “What is this object?” to “What is it associated with?”

Its connection to Russia — through flag, origin, and symbolic meaning — automatically moved the vessel into a risk category. Within this logic, its cultural status no longer provided protection.

When Symbol Overrides Substance

One of the most striking aspects of this case is the substitution of substance with symbolism.

In substance: educational activity, historical reconstruction, international collaboration.
In symbolism: the Russian flag, historical association with Russia, the context of an ongoing conflict.

Under political tension, the symbolic dimension became decisive — not necessarily through explicit legal wording, but through broader interpretation: a symbol may be treated as a potential instrument of influence.

This fundamentally changes the underlying logic of how such cases are assessed. Where culture was once considered “outside politics,” it can now be interpreted as an extension of it.

The Role of Pressure: How Campaigning Integrated into the System

Public campaigning played an important role — but not as simple external pressure. More precisely, it operated by leveraging the existing legal framework.

Individuals and campaigners opposing the vessel did not need to prove that it directly violated the law. Instead, the strategy was to demonstrate that, under current sanctions, it could be interpreted as a risk.

From there, a familiar bureaucratic mechanism took over: every official decision is evaluated through the lens of risk; allowing the vessel may trigger controversy; prohibiting it carries minimal consequences.

This creates a structural asymmetry: permission requires justification; prohibition does not.

As a result, the system naturally gravitates toward restriction.

The Failure of Cultural Logic in a Non-Cultural Environment

One reason the defense of the Shtandart proved ineffective lies in the mismatch of arguments.

Appeals to culture, education, and apolitical intent work in stable environments. Under sanctions, they are outweighed by harder categories: risk, security, and policy.

This creates a fundamental disconnect: one side speaks the language of values, the other speaks the language of risk management.

In such conditions, the latter prevails.

The Expanding Nature of Law as the New Normal

The most important takeaway is not about a single vessel, but about the nature of law in times of conflict.

Law does not disappear — but it changes its properties: it becomes more flexible, allows broader interpretations, and shifts from proof to prevention.

This means that the boundaries of legal application can move faster than stakeholders can adapt.

Implications

The Shtandart case illustrates a broader pattern: cultural status alone does not shield a project from political frameworks, and even indirect or symbolic associations may become decisive in administrative decision-making. In practice, risk avoidance often takes precedence, limiting the space in which cultural initiatives can operate — particularly in sanctions contexts linked to geopolitical conflict.

Conclusion

The case of the Shtandart is an example of how cultural initiatives can be caught in and constrained by sanctions regimes shaped by geopolitical conflict. It highlights a central point: the protection of cultural heritage, particularly in times of conflict, is a widely recognised principle, but in practice it can come into tension with broader political and security considerations.

Publié par Bernard Grua

Graduated from Paris "Institut d'Etudes Politiques", financial auditor, photographer, founder and spokesperson of the worldwide movement which opposed to the delivery of Mistral invasion vessels to Putin's Russia, contributor to French and foreign media for culture, heritage and geopolitics.

Un avis sur « Russian frigate Shtandart: culture as a ground for sanctions? »

Laisser un commentaire