Note on the Russian vessel Shtandart – Application of EU sanctions and access to European ports (2022–2026)

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Note on the Russian vessel Shtandart – Application of EU sanctions and access to European ports (2022–2026)

Factual and legal overview provided in response to a request from Ukrainian diplomatic services

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Purpose
This note provides a factual and legal overview of the situation of the Russian vessel Shtandart, MMSI 518999255, with regard to its access to French and European ports since the entry into force of EU port sanctions on 16 April 2022. It is intended as background information for internal or diplomatic use.

Scope
The document covers:

  • the vessel’s movements and port calls in European waters since 2022;
  • the conditions of its establishment in France and subsequent changes of flag;
  • the bans and restrictions imposed by several European states;
  • the vessel’s management, ownership structure and documented links to Russian state actors;
  • the specific French administrative context and possible diplomatic follow-up.

Legal basis
The analysis is based on EU restrictive measures, notably Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and subsequent amendments, as well as relevant national administrative decisions and judicial rulings. Of particular importance is the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on 22 August 2025, which definitively rejected the Shtandart’s attempts to challenge the application of EU port sanctions or to advance a selective interpretation of the regulation. All references are listed in the annexes.

Status of the document
This note is a factual and non-exhaustive background document. All statements are supported by primary sources cited in the text and annexes.

Author
Collective No Shtandart in Europe

Date
23 January 2026

Executive Summary

This note provides a concise factual and legal overview of the Russian vessel Shtandart and its access to French territorial waters.

Access and ports: After EU port sanctions came into force on 16 April 2022, the Shtandart re-entered French waters in June 2022 and established La Rochelle as its base, despite its Russian registry. In June 2024, it changed to a Cook Islands flag of convenience.

Itineraries and restrictions (2022–2026): The vessel made numerous port calls, including unannounced stopovers, participated in paid maritime events, and repeatedly attempted to bypass restrictions. It has been formally banned from ports and territorial waters in Spain, Portugal, and other EU countries. A 2026 return to France raises enforcement concerns.

Management and Russian links: Vladimir Martus remains the de facto owner and captain, using corporate intermediaries and a flag of convenience. He has documented ties to Russian state authorities and media.

French administrative context: Port sanctions fall under the departmental prefect, and enforcement in France has been limited. Experience shows that explicit governmental or EU-level requests are decisive.

This summary is supported by detailed sources, regulations, and judicial decisions cited in the attached note.

Table of contents 

1. Russian vessel Shtandart‘s access to French territorial waters

The Shtandart, MMSI 518999255, was in Port-de-Bouc, France, when port sanctions came into force (Article 3ea of EU Regulation No 833/2014) on 16 April 2022. It remained there for about a month. From the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean, it stopped in Portugal and in Spain. It re-entered French territorial waters, in the Gulf of Biscay, on 6 June 2022. It was at this point that Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian activists took up the case.

2. Port of entry and stay in France for the Shtandart

The Shtandart docked in La Rochelle on 8 June 2022, with the agreement of the prefecture, the municipality and the port authorities. It made La Rochelle its base port. It should be noted that its port of registry was Saint Petersburg until it was transferred to the Cook Islands flag of convenience on 6 June 2024. Its port of registry is now Avarua, which it never visited.

3. Ports of call, routes and bans (2022–2026) for the Shtandart 

3.1. Years 2022 and 2023

Since June 2022, the Shtandart has visited a significant number of French ports and participated in numerous maritime events where it was paid for its services. Its Automatic Identification System (AIS) was switched off between June 2022 and June 2024. It is therefore difficult to account for all of its voyages.

The Shtandart attempted to return to Spain in July 2022. Thanks to the Ukrainian association in Vigo, it was banned from participating in the Ruta Iacobus Maris festival in Vigo in July 2022 and from calling at La Coruña. It then returned to La Rochelle. In 2023, the Shtandart remained in French ports.

3.2. Year 2024

The Shtandart stayed in France, in the English Channel and Atlantic Ocean, until February 2024, before heading to Sète on the Mediterranean Sea. 

On its outward journey, it made an unannounced stopover in Almerimar (Andalusia, Spain). On its return, it was banned from participating in the Escala a Castelló festival (Spain) and from stopping in Denia (Spain) thanks to the local Ukrainian associations. Nevertheless, it made an unannounced stopover in Valencia and possibly a second stopover in Almerimar.

The Shtandart then returned to La Rochelle and continued to participate or attempt to participate in maritime events in France. 

In July 2024, the Shtandart travelled to the Iacobus Maris Experience in Vigo. However, it was formally banned from entering all Spanish ports (en) thanks to the action of the association of Ukrainians in Galicia. Furthermore, as a result of its infringements, the Shtandart was banned from Spanish territorial waters (es) from 27 July 2024. It then returned to La Rochelle.

3.3. Year 2025

In 2025, the Shtandart made numerous calls in La Rochelle. It made a stop in Les-Sables d’Olonne. It participated in the Gulf of Morbihan Week. 

In July 2025, the Shtandart set sail for a major European tour and to participate in the Tall Ships Races. It was banned from the seven countries where it wished to dock. It was not allowed to participate in the Tall Ships Races. It had to cancel its fourteen planned stopovers(en). It therefore cut short its cruise and returned to La Rochelle. 

In mid-September 2025, the Shtandart set sail for the Mediterranean Sea. It was banned from docking in Spain and Portugal, thanks to the Ukrainian World Congress and the union of Ukrainians in Portugal. It therefore docked in Tangier, Morocco, then Bizerte, Tunisia, before heading for Turkey. It took part in a film shoot there, and then picked up customers for cruises along the Anatolian coast.

All the details relating to the year 2025 are set out in the attached report: “Shtandart Vessel – Exclusions and Port Call Restrictions in Europe, 2025” (en)1 

3.4. Year 2026 

At the end of June 2026, the Shtandart plans to sail from La Rochelle to Saint-Malo with various stops in Brittany. This trip is being marketed by the Smolensk-based travel agency Kombat-Tours: “Kombat-Tours: 21–30 June 2026, aboard the frigate Shtandart, family cruise along the French coast” (ru)2

However, the Shtandart may return earlier to France. It will be in Bizerte on 28 April 2026.

This is why it is important to formally and effectively oppose its return to European and particularly French territorial waters.

4.1. Shtandart management 

Vladimir Martus is the captain of the Shtandart and a Russian citizen. He is also its de facto owner. 

In spring 2024, ownership of the ship was officially transferred from the Saint Petersburg-based company Shtandart Project to Mariia Martus. She is Mr Martus’s daughter. She holds a Finnish passport and may still hold a Russian one.

Martus TV GmbH is the managing owner (en) of the Shtandart. This commercial company is domiciled in a Hamburg mailbox. Vladimir Martus owns 80% of it and his wife, Irina Ermakova, owns the remaining 20%. In practice, this is a Russian company, and Vladimir Martus is the owner of the Shtandart.

The Shtandart‘s choice of the Cook Islands flag of convenienc was, as previously stated, a strategic move to conceal its Russian nationality.

These facts, along with the frequent disabling of the AIS, suggest patterns comparable to those observed within the Russian shadow fleet, as detailed in this article: “Why is the sanctioned ship ‘Shtandart’ part of the Russian shadow fleet?” (en)3

4.2. Vladimir Martus’s connections with the Russian regime.

This is an important and extensive topic. Here, it will be summarised in a few points.

Until 2009, the Shtandart was the emblematic ship of Saint Petersburg (fr) (ru). From that period onwards, Vladimir Martus established connections with key Russian authorities, the municipality, Valentina Matviyenko (governor) and possibly others. 

In 2009, the Shtandart sailed off the Russian coast due to violations of Russian security regulations. It probably remained abroad for business purposes, or possibly for additional reasons. Vladimir Martus claims he left Russia because he opposes the Russian regime. However, Russian evidence does not support this claim. See: “Shtandart”, 2009, Vladimir Martus’ refusal to comply with safety regulations falsely presented as political opposition to Putin’s regime.” (en)4 

The following offers an alternative point of view to that promoted by Vladimir Martus:

5. French administrative context and possible follow-up

According to European regulations and French legislation, the departmental prefect is responsible for port sanctions (fr).

The prefect for the Charente-Maritime department (including La Rochelle) is Brice Blondel, former head of staff to Emmanuel Macron. He shows some “understanding” for Vladimir Martus. Part of the French state apparatus thinks the same way, as evidenced by the internal documents collected here: “The French authorities and the special privileges granted to the Russian ship Shtandart” (fr).

Brice Blondel will not change his policy unless he is compelled to do so by the French head of state in response to formal and explicit requests from the Ukrainian government and the European Commission. Even in this case, however, the Shtandart will continue to force access to ports by making unannounced port calls, using media pressure and humanitarian narratives. These are common practices for the Russian frigate according to numerous examples observed since 2022. The only solution for this Russian ship would be a ban on French territorial waters, as in Spain and Portugal. 

The Ukrainian representation in Paris has been fully aware of the situation since 2022, as presented in this information note: “The case of the Russian ship Shtandart and the role of the Ukrainian Embassy in France” (fr)7

This document also contains a complete list of EU regulations and judicial decisions. It clearly explains why and how the Shtandart is banned from European ports. This crucial information is additionally presented below in an exhibit in English and in Ukrainian.

Conclusion

The Shtandart case is an international issue that is being closely followed by Ukrainian citizens and Ukrainian public figures. It is also a topic covered by the Ukrainian media. It is a concern for the Ukrainian diaspora in Western European countries.

Until now, all of Shtandart‘s setbacks and the implementation of EU regulations or national laws have been the result of the determined actions of Ukrainian embassies and diaspora communities in numerous European countries. This is explained in detail in this memorandum: “Participation of Ukrainian actors and the Ukrainian diaspora in the case of the Russian ship ‘Shtandart’ (2022–2025)” (fr)8

The French exception raises serious questions. 
Experience since 2022 suggests that exchanges at local administrative or port level have not produced results. The embassy of Ukraine would find interest working with the Ukrainian MFA in order to prepare an official request demanding that the French government ban the Shtandart from its territorial waters.. 

Appendix 1
Legal and administrative references (“Shtandart”)

DateAuthority Act / Decision Subject / Content Language
8 Apr 2022 European CouncilFifth Package of Restrictive MeasuresRestrictive measures, including port sanctions, introduced in response to the Bucha massacre EN
16 Apr 2022European CouncilArticle 3ea of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014Entry into force of EU port sanctions concerning vessels flying the Russian flagEN
24 Jun 2024European CouncilDecision (CFSP) No 2024/1744, Art. 4haExplicit confirmation that EU port sanctions also apply to replicas of historical vessels    EN
7 Jul 2024Prefect of FinistèreOrderProhibition of the Shtandart from accessing all ports of the departmentFR
11 Jul 2024Administrative Court of RennesRuling No 2403878Rejection of the Shtandart’s appeal against the Finistère Prefect’s orderFR
12 Jul 2024European CommissionLetter to No Shtandart in EuropeConfirmation of the application of EU port sanctions to the ShtandartEN
27 Jul 2024Maritime Administration (Spain)Administrative and police measures Evacuation and prohibition of the Shtandart in Spanish territorial watersES
18 Nov 2024 Conseil d’État (France)Ruling No 496439Rejection of the appeal against the Administrative Court decisionEN
7 Aug 2025European CommissionLetter to No Shtandart in EuropeConfirmation of the application of sanctions to the ShtandartFR
22 Aug 2025Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)Case T-446/24, ruling Confirmation of the application of port sanctions to the Shtandart as of 16 Apr 2022EN
24 Sep 2025Autoridade Marítima Nacional (Portugal)Administrative and police measuresDetention of five crew members and prohibition of the vessel in territorial watersPT

Додаток 2
Юридичні та адміністративні посилання («Штандарт»)

ДатаОрганАкт / РішенняПредмет / ЗмістМова
8 квітня 2022Європейська радаП’ятий пакет обмежувальних заходівОбмежувальні заходи, зокрема портові, що запроваджують санкції у відповідь на різанину в Бучі(англ.)
16 квітня 2022Європейська радаСтаття 3ea Регламенту (ЄС)  No 833/2014 Набуття чинності портовими санкціями ЄС щодо суден, що ходять під російським прапором(англ.)
24 червня 2024Європейська радаРішення (СПБО) № 2024/1744, стаття 4haЧітке підтвердження того, що портові санкції ЄС також застосовуються до реплік історичних суден(англ.)
7 липня 2024Префект ФіністеруРозпорядженняЗаборона доступу «Штандарта» до всіх портів департаменту(фр.)
11 липня 2024Адміністративний суд РеннаУхвала № 2403878Відхилення скарги «Штандарта» проти розпорядження Фіністеру(фр.)
12 липня 2024Європейська комісіяЛист до No Shtandart in EuropeПідтвердження застосування портових санкцій ЄС до судна(англ.)
27 липня 2024Управління торгового флотуАдміністративні та поліцейські заходиЕвакуація та заборона «Штандарта» у територіальних водах Іспанії(ісп.)
18 листопада 2024Державна радаПостанова
№ 496439		Відхилення апеляції на рішення адміністративного суду(укр.)
7 серпня 2025Європейська комісіяЛист до No Shtandart in EuropeПідтвердження застосування санкцій до «Штандарта»(фр.)
22 серпня 2025Суд Європейського СоюзуСправа T-446/24, ухвалаПідтвердження застосування портових санкцій до «Штандарта» з 16 квітня 2022 року(англ.)
24 вересня 2025Autoridade Marítima Nacional (Порт.)Адміністративні та поліцейські заходиЗатримання п’яти членів екіпажу та заборона судна у територіальних водах(порт.)
  1.  2025 report in Ukrainian and in French:
    – Пан’європейський колектив викривачів Російське судно «Штандарт»: заборони та обмеження заходів у порти Європи у 2025 році
    – Navire « Shtandart » : exclusions et restrictions d’escales en Europe en 2025 ↩︎
  2.  Kombat‑Tours cruise in French:
    Kombat‑Tours : 21–30 juin 2026, à bord de la frégate “Shtandart”, croisière familiale le long des côtes françaises ↩︎
  3. Shtandart and the Russian shadow fleet in French:
    Pourquoi le navire sous sanctions “Shtandart » fait-il partie de la flotte fantôme russe ? ↩︎
  4. Is Vladimir Martus an opponent (in French)?
    « Shtandart » 2009, le refus de respecter les règles de sécurité fallacieusement présenté, par Vladimir Martus, comme une opposition politique au régime de Poutine ↩︎
  5. The Greek diplomatic mission in Russian:
    Русское географическое общество – Эффект бабочки: почему появление российского парусного фрегата взбудоражило Грецию ↩︎
  6. Communique from the Consulate General of Russia in Russian:
    Консульство РФ назвало абсурдом запрет кораблю « Штандарт » зайти в порт Шотландии ↩︎
  7. Embassy information note in Ukrainian:
    Справа російського судна «Штандарт» та роль Посольства України у Франції ↩︎
  8. Memorandum about Ukraine and “Shtandart” in Ukrainian
    Меморандум про участь українських акторів та української діаспори у справі російського судна «Штандарта» (2022–2025) ↩︎

Publié par Bernard Grua

Graduated from Paris "Institut d'Etudes Politiques", financial auditor, photographer, founder and spokesperson of the worldwide movement which opposed to the delivery of Mistral invasion vessels to Putin's Russia, contributor to French and foreign media for culture, heritage and geopolitics.

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