Is the sanctioned « Shtandart » a Russian spy ship?

By disconnecting its Automatic identification system (AIS) between Norway and France and making a secret stopover in the port of Hvide Sande, the sanctioned Russian ship Shtandart has sparked a wave of outrage and suspicion in Denmark. However, can we claim that it is a Russian spy ship, as suggested by tvSyd, a Danish media?

Readers will find below some information to help them form their own opinion.

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• Clarification sent to tsSyd, 9 September 2025
• Initial information sent to tvSyd, 7 August 2025
  1. A Russian ship cherished by Saint Petersburg
  2. An ambassador and an instrument of Russian imperialist propaganda
  3. A formidable lever of influence
  4. An excellent platform for intelligence gathering
  5. A search for stealth
  6. An interest in strategic sites
• Conclusion
• See also

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Clarification sent to tsSyd, 9 September 2025

From: No Shtandart In Europe 
To: Martin Riber Jakobsen, tvSyd
Re: « …Bernard Grua’s assessment of the ship as a spy ship… »
9 September 2025

Dear Martin,

I read your last article about Shtandart (08/09/2025).

Formodet russisk spionskib lå i dansk havn trods forbud – andre uvelkomne skibe kan også få adgang (Suspected Russian spy ship docked in Danish port despite ban – other unwelcome ships may also be granted access)

You write:

– « … Bernard Grua… said that based on a number of pieces of evidence, he believes he can say that the ship has connections to the Russian state and is carrying out espionage tasks.

– ‘..Bernard Grua’s assessment of the ship as a spy ship’

In this complex case, where misinformation and fanciful allegations abound, we are committed to producing documented and verifiable facts.

Given the numerous factual elements that I presented to you on 7 August 2025 (see below) in‘Shtandart: a POTENTIAL threat to national security’, I explained why this ship and Vladimir Martus could be of interest to the Russian services. I wrote to you that the Shtandart is :

1. A Russian ship cherished by Saint Petersburg
2. An ambassador and an instrument of Russian imperialist propaganda
3. A formidable lever of influence
4. An excellent platform for intelligence gathering
5. A search for stealth
6. An interest in strategic sites”

However, we have no proof that it is engaged in a spy  activity. I am therefore not claiming that it is a spy ship. At most, it can be considered a POTENTIAL threat to national security.

Sincerely yours,
Bernard Grua

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Initial information sent to tvSyd, 7 August 2025

From: No Shtandart In Europe 
To: Martin Riber Jakobsen, tvSyd
Re: Shtandart: a POTENTIAL threat to national security
7 August 2025

Dear Martin,

I have compiled a list of national security issues raised by the Shtandart. Most of the information comes from a paper I wrote in December 2022, with additional details from an English presentation of September 2023.

• https://bernardgrua.net/2022/12/05/russe-shtandart-menace-securite-nationale/
• https://bernardgrua.net/2023/09/24/la-rochelle-shtandart-occupation-en/#national-security

In July 2024, we obtained that the Shtandart banned was from all Finistère ports, including the full roadstead of Brest and the bay of Douarnenez. Since July 2024, the Shtandart has also been unable to turn off its AIS in French territorial waters.

1. A Russian ship cherished by Saint Petersburg

The Russian frigate Shtandart was built in the 1990s with the support of the municipality of Saint Petersburg, at a time when Anatoly Sobchak was mayor. One of Sobchak’s closest advisers was Vladimir Putin. The Shtandart is registered in Saint Petersburg, Russia. It sails under the Russian flag (before June 2024). It is owned by the « Shtandart Project » organisation, based in Saint Petersburg, more than 60% of whose shares are held by Vladimir Martus, the captain(before June 2024). The remaining 40% are held by people close to Vladimir Martus. Martus is therefore, in effect, the owner and operator of a vessel that can be considered a private yacht. Vladimir Martus was born (1966), grew up and was educated in Leningrad, now Saint Petersburg. He is a Russian national and citizen. Saint Petersburg is where his wife and children live (2018).

2. An ambassador and an instrument of Russian imperialist propaganda

Less than six months before the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as the sound of Russian boots became deafening, the Shtandart carried out a very official mission on behalf of the Russian Federation in the Aegean Sea in October 2021 for the Russian Geographical Society, under the leadership of Sergei Shoigu, the minister responsible for the war in Ukraine. The expedition’s objective was to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the victory at Chesma against the Ottoman Empire.

• See the report by the Russian Geographical Society 01/11/2021: The butterfly effect: why the appearance of the russian sailing frigate excited Greece.
• See the report by Andrei Maslov, Russia’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Greece, 18/02/2022: Андрей Маслов: для антироссийской пропаганды почва в Греции не благоприятна

 It should be noted that the Aegean expedition of the Shtandart took place under the auspices of Vladimir Putin. It was financed by the Russian Presidential Administration’s Grant Fund, i.e. from Putin’s personal coffers.

• See the presentation of the mission by the Russian Geographical Society 06/07/2020: Путешествие сквозь века: в год 250-летия чесменского сражения к греческим островам отправится уникальная экспедиция

During its port visits, unless expressly prohibited by local authorities, the Shtandart flies the Russian flag and ensign (war flame).

3. A formidable lever of influence

Vladimir Martus, who is close to the Russian government, enjoys a prodigious network of influence in the maritime sector, in the French senior civil service, among politicians, maritime festival organisers and local authorities. He is bound to be of interest to the special services of a government hostile to France and eager for levers of influence.

4. An excellent platform for intelligence gathering

The Shtandart, equipped with two 560 horsepower engines, is overpowered and particularly manoeuvrable.

It has a shallow draught and is rigged with a 33-metre-high mainmast. Its wooden hull and textile rigging make it less visible on radar screens. These features could make the Shtandart an excellent platform for acoustic, radio, magnetic and optical intelligence gathering at a time when other Russian ships are banned from our shores.

5. A search for stealth

After the restrictive measures were adopted, just before its first arrival in La Rochelle, the Shtandart deactivated (06/06/2022) its AIS*. This behaviour, aimed at better concealing its movements, is consistent with that of other Russian ships circumventing international sanctions.

Note: AIS*, or ‘Automatic Identification System’, is a navigation tool and aid. It transmits information about transmitting vessels within a certain radius to other vessels. Above all, it allows transmitting vessels to be visible despite difficult conditions and to avoid collisions. It displays: ship name, flag, MMSI number (unique identification number for each ship), ship position, course, speed, port of departure and arrival.

6. An interest in strategic sites

At a time when not a week goes by without Russia threatening us with nuclear apocalypse, these are risk areas that should not be overlooked. In any case, since June 2022, the Shtandart, with its AIS disconnected, has shown a keen interest in the Brest harbour and the Crozon peninsula. In the past, it does not appear to have visited them with such frequency. The Russian ship has the option of visiting the other military ports of Toulon, Lorient and Cherbourg or the DGA missile testing sites (DGA EM) in Biscarosse and Ile du Levant.   

Bernard Grua
Sincerely yours,

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Conclusion

The journalists at tvSyd provide valuable reporting. By sharing my email exchanges, I want to clarify that I never claimed the Shtandart is a spy ship, but highlighted factual behaviors that warrant legitimate attention. This transparency ensures my comments are not misinterpreted and supports constructive dialogue with the media.

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Original emails

9 September 2025

7 August 2025

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See also