“Shtandart”: the judicial harassment strategy orchestrated by Thierry Clerc and the Russian Vladimir Martus against Bernard Grua

Publié parBernard GruaPublié dansClerc AvocatsÉtiquettes :, , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Shtandart/ the judicial harassment strategy orchestrated by Thierry Clerc and the Russian Vladimir Martus against Bernard Grua
Ce dossier en français
Since 2023, Thierry Clerc and Vladimir Martus have launched, against, Bernard Grua, the spokesperson of the collective No Shtandart in Europe, a series of legal measures: formal notices, police report, criminal complaint, interventions with French authorities, and public communication campaigns. All these initiatives, none of which succeeded in court, fit into a pattern that the European Union recognizes as SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation): actions intended to intimidate and deter critical expression, without any real prospect of success in the courts.

The term “judicial harassment” is used here in its objective meaning: it refers to the accumulation of repeated legal actions directed at the same person, without favorable outcome for those initiating them, but creating cost, stress, and psychological pressure on the targeted party. Such an accumulation, documented precisely in the chronology that follows, corresponds to the commonly accepted definition of this type of abusive practice.

This article recounts that chronology and highlights the implications for freedom of expression and the protection of whistleblowers.

  1. Context: the actors in a legal tension
  2. Chronology of actions by Clerc and Martus
  3. Bernard Grua’s proactive defense
  4. Judicial failure of the Clerc–Martus strategy
  5. Interpretation: a pattern of procedural harassment (SLAPP)
  6. Summary and lessons
  7. Conclusion: legal protection, ethics, democratic stakes
  • Bernard Grua, a former naval officer, cofounder and spokesperson of the international movement No Mistrals for Putin (2014), and founder of the collective No Shtandart in Europe (2022). He has repeatedly denounced the non-observance of EU sanctions (Regulation UE 833/2014, Article 3ea)1 imposed following the Bucha massacre2, directed at the Russian three-masted ship Shtandart since 16 April 20223.
  • Vladimir Martus4, the hidden owner and captain of the ship Shtandart5, reportedly under the Cook Islands flag since June 2024; nonetheless, he is represented by the collective as a « violator of sanctions ».
  • Thierry Clerc6, lawyer in Rouen, acting formally as counsel to Martus. He is said to lead a strategy of coercive legal actions against any public criticism.

2. Chronology of actions by Thierry Clerc and Vladimir Martus

2.1 First formal notice (15 May 2023) — alleged counterfeiting and unfair competition

By a letter dated 15 May 2023 addressed to Bernard Grua in the name of La Semaine du Golfe du Morbihan (chaired by Gérard d’Aboville), Clerc accuses Grua of “usurpation of trademark” (No. 3197270 INPI), illicit use of the hashtag #SemaineDuGolfe, and incitement to unfair competition to the detriment of the festival, allegedly without creation, effort, or commercial transparency7.

➡️ Problem: Grua has no commercial activity. The accusations are legally unfounded and suggest intimidation8.

2.2 Second formal notice (late October 2024) — disseminated, threatening … but no follow-through

At the end of October 2024, as Grua intensifies his criticisms concerning the legitimacy of Shtandart, Clerc sends a second formal notice demanding immediate removal of all content (tweets, blogs, PDF documents)9. He denounces “false content” and threatens “moral and material harm.”

➡️ No legal action ensues — a purely bullying gesture.

2.3 Police report (“main courante”) (23 November 2024) — alleged acts in January 2022 … and initial refusal to file complaint

On 23 November 2024, Vladimir Martus — advised by Clerc — files a police record in La Rochelle for “cyberharassment” and threats from Bernard Grua10.

➡️ The reported events took place before the sanctions (January 2022), when the Shtandart was still in Greece. Martus himself stated that there was no reason to file a complaint — before doing so ten days later.

2.4 Alleged seizure of “the Order of Bar Associations” (23 November 2024)

In his Police report dated 23 November 2024, Vladimir Martus cites a seizure order from the ‘bar association’ (sic) for defamation against Thierry Clerc.

➡️ An unfounded allegation with no legal value.

2.5 Criminal complaint (9 December 2024) — shift in arguments

On 9 December 2024, Thierry Clerc files a criminal complaint with the Nantes prosecutor’s office on behalf of Martus, for defamation, incitement to violence, and threats. In particular, he is requesting, on behalf of the Russian party, the identification of all authors, as well as the complete removal of the disputed content11.

➡️ The original allegations (counterfeiting, unfair competition) are omitted. The charges are radically different, underscoring a lack of coherence and suggesting the earlier notices were more intimidation than substantive claims.

2.6 Letter from Clerc to Gabriel Attal (18 March 2025): distortion, misinformation, and judicial intimidation

On 18 March 2025, Clerc shares his October 2024 SLAPP procedure with Gabriel Attal (former Prime Minister and Chairman of the France-Ukraine Friendship Group at the French National Assembly.12), along with the legal memorandum filed before the Rennes Administrative Court (04/10/2024), the police report (23/11/2024), and the 9 December 2024 complaint — documents unknown until then to Bernard Grua.

➡️ The police report and the filing of the complaint are thus understood as a process aimed at giving an official appearance to the slander against Grua.

2.7 Open letter from Vladimir Martus to French maritime authorities (15 May 2025): defamation, harassment, victimization

On 15 May 2025, Martus denounces Grua to French maritime authorities13, accusing him of leading a harassment campaign to prevent the Shtandart from docking in Europe. He levels accusations (including death threats) without proof.

➡️ Classic reversal of roles: Martus seeks to discredit the whistleblower instead of addressing the core issues.

2.8 Hostile communication via Russian media (14 July 2024)

An article by RIA Novosti on 14 July 202414 explicitly names Bernard Grua and the collective No Shtandart in Europe. This is part of a broader campaign to discredit the whistleblowers. During summer 2024, hundreds of Russian articles15 appear, following interviews with Martus, Jean-Paul Hellequin (Mor Glaz association)16, given to Russian propaganda outlets17.

Being publicly named by Russian state media may also pose an actual physical risk in the current climate of geopolitical tension and influence operations, especially for individuals opposing Russian interests.

➡️ This attack underscores the convergence of judicial actions and disinformation campaigns — amplifying pressure on whistleblowers and reinforcing the intimidation aspect.

3. Bernard Grua’s proactive defense

By not hiring a legal counsel, Grua avoids one of the main goals of a SLAPP: financially exhausting the whistleblower. Moreover, as he is not bound by professional secrecy, he can communicate freely. This approach strengthens the No Shtandart in Europe collective and raises public awareness.

It also has consequences for Thierry Clerc, now portrayed as tied to Russian interests seeking to challenge European Council decisions.

3.1 The five pillars of the counter-strategy
  • 3.1.1. Transparent communication, with public release of all acts (including those of the opposing side)
  • 3.1.2. Citizen mobilization: a boomerang effect against the attackers
  • 3.1.3. Firm responses to SLAPP attempts
  • 3.1.4. Procedures with judicial and administrative authorities
  • 3.1.5. Documented, reasoned rebuttals
3.2 Responses to SLAPPs

3.2.1 On 15 May 2023, Grua replies to Clerc regarding the first SLAPP and alerts social media18

3.2.2 In response to the recurrence by Clerc, and supported by clarifications from the European Council (24 June 2024)19, a prefectural decision (7 July 2024)20, the Rennes tribunal judgment (11 July 2024)21, and confirmation by the European Commission (12 July 2024)22, Grua counters the new Thierry Clerc‘s legal offensive.

3.2.3 On 14 November 2024, he replies to Clerc’s second SLAPP23, refuting calumnious claims and dismantling the flawed narrative about sanctions — ultimately invalidated by the Conseil d’État24 within fifteen days.

3.2.4 This generates a Streisand effect25, amplified by social media26 27 and the platforms Grua manages28 29.

3.2.5 On 15 January 2025, two months after replying to the second notice, Grua writes to Clerc asking if, following the Conseil d’État ruling, the firm Clerc & Partners remains involved30. Clerc responds the same day, promising to inform him of next steps — but does not mention the police report or complaint filed in November and December 2024. These only become known from the letter Clerc sends to Gabriel Attal on 18 March 2025.

3.3 Challenging political and institutional networks

3.3.1 Following Clerc’s letter to Gabriel Attal (18 March 2025), Grua writes to Attal on 24 March, alerting him to the sanctions fraud concerning Shtandart, in which Attal is implicated by Clerc31.

3.3.2 Vladimir Martus’s reference to a referral to the ‘bar association’ in his complaint led to a request for clarification being sent to Thierry Clerc on 28 March 202532. The president of the Rouen Bar Association was copied in on this correspondence.

3.3.2 More broadly, the attached documents allow, on 29 March 2025, the formalization of Clerc’s harassment method, meant to enforce silence via procedural dominance 33

3.4 Cooperation with judicial and security authorities

3.4.1 On 31 March 2025, Grua contacts the La Rochelle police to clarify the police record filed by Martus.

3.4.2 He then had the opportunity to speak with the commander of the Charente-Maritime Territorial Intelligence Service, who discussed the subject of this Russian interference operation with him in a cordial manner. The latter advised him to contact the Loire-Atlantique Territorial Intelligence Service, in collaboration with the services of the Public Prosecutor of the Nantes Judicial Court.

3.4.3 Also on 31 March, the No Shtandart in Europe collective officially submits official requests for hearings to the Nantes Public Prosecutor and Loire-Atlantique Territorial Intelligence Service, asking for full review and consideration of all facts34.

3.5 Documented rebuttals and public dissemination

3.5.1 In early April 2025, Grua methodically dismantles the reply memorandum of Isabelle Enard-Bazire and Clerc aiming to annul the Finistère prefect’s decision, posting detailed sourced commentary on each point35.

3.5.2 The document is submitted to the Finistère prefectural litigation department on 4 April 202536.

3.5.3 The work is taken up by the press in May 2025 in a scathing exposé of the Russian vessel37.

3.5.4 Public copies of legal acts (letters, police record, memorandum, written requests) are spread via Medium38, Google Sites39, and his blog40, to ensure transparency and challenge Martus/Clerc’s narrative.

4. Judicial failure of the Clerc–Martus strategy

4.1 Rennes Administrative Tribunal — summary proceedings dismissed (11 July 2024)

On 7 July 2024, the Finistère prefect issued an order prohibiting Shtandart from accessing Finistère ports. The summary application filed by Martus (via Clerc) was dismissed on 11 July 2024: the tribunal found no serious doubt as to the legality of the prefectural decision.

4.2 Conseil d’État — appeal inadmissible (18 November 2024)

The Conseil d’État (French Council of State) rejects Martus’s appeal (under the admissibility review procedure), finding no serious grounds were raised.

4.3. Court of Justice of the European union (CJUE) – action dismissed (22 August 2025)

The CJEU formally confirmed the strict prohibition of any call by the Russian vessel Shtandart at Union ports. This decision expressly substanciated the application of Article 3ea of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, with no possibility of legal appeal.

➡️ All attempts fail: a demonstration of procedural abuse.

5. Interpretation: a pattern of procedural harassment (SLAPP)

This series of actions exhibits classic features of a SLAPP41:

  • Multiplicity of intimidating acts (formal notices, police report, criminal complaint)
  • Legal bases vague or ill-suited (unfounded counterfeiting claims, late defamation framing)
  • Aimed at deterrence: silencing an influential whistleblower
  • The EU Directive 2024/1069 (effective 11 April 2024)42 enables — from the outset — the dismissal of manifestly unfounded suits, ordering the author to pay the defendant’s costs, or imposing financial sanctions

➡️ Because French civil/penal law lacks a direct equivalent tool, such procedural circumventions remain possible, even when deemed abusive in spirit43.

6. Summary and lessons

StageWhat it showsLegal conclusion
First formal notice (May 2023)Illogical accusation (unfair competition) with no follow-throughNo real basis — judicial manipulation
RIA Novosti coverage (July 2024)Media targeting and reputational riskFusion of legal action and propaganda
Second notice (Oct 2024)Strong threats with no legal follow-upSymbolic, intimidating, not judicially pursued
Police report (Nov 2024)Allegations predating sanctions; initial refusal to fileContradictory memory; no concrete foundation
Alleged “seizure of bar order” (Nov 2024)Intimidation invoking fictitious authorityFalse claim with no legal effect
Criminal complaint (Dec 2024)Incoherence with earlier notices; new allegationsTactical, opaque litigation without clarity
Letter to Attal (Mar 2025)Attempt to discredit whistleblower via public institutionsDefamation and abuse of legal defense
Letter from Martus to maritime authorities (May 2025)Role inversion, pressure on authoritiesPublic defamation possibly subject to legal challenge
Defense by Bernard GruaHearings, transparency, full disclosure Citizen mobilization
Judicial resultsAll suits by Martus/Clerc dismissed or inadmissible Illustrating an abusive procedural scheme backfiring

None of the legal actions initiated by Thierry Clerc and Vladimir Martus — directed against a French and European citizen and clearly serving Russian interests in a context where Russia wages an aggressive war against Ukraine44 — succeeded. However, their accumulation exemplifies the predatory nature of judicial harassment: beyond legal failure, these tactics impose financial cost, time burden, psychological stress, and reputational risk on the target.

This is precisely what defines SLAPPs: diverting the judicial system from its intended purpose to weaken, overwhelm, and intimidate a critical citizen. Recognized now at the European level, this phenomenon demands heightened vigilance and stronger protective mechanisms under the 11 April 2024 directive45. It concerns not only whistleblowers, but more broadly the defense of free expression, democratic principles, and the rule of law.

Notes

  1. European Council – Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014, Article 3ea ↩︎
  2. European Council, 08/04/2022 – EU adopts fifth package of sanctions against Russia over its military aggression against Ukraine ↩︎
  3. No Shtandart In Europe, 12/02/2025 – Sanctions alert: in La Rochelle, the circumvention of EU Regulation by the Russian vessel Shtandart continues despite the clarification by the European Council and the ruling of the Council of State ↩︎
  4. No Shtandart Google Site – Page “Vladimir Martus” ↩︎
  5. Wikipedia – “Shtandart” ↩︎
  6. No Shtandart Google Site – Page “Me Thierry Clerc” ↩︎
  7. Clerc Avocats, 15/05/2023 – Formal notice to Bernard Grua on behalf of Gérard d’Aboville and the “Semaine du Golfe du Morbihan » (Fr) ↩︎
  8. No Shtandart in Europe, 15/05/2023 – SLAPP action by Me Thierry Clerc and the “Semaine du Golfe”: are their allegations admissible? (Fr) ↩︎
  9. Clerc Avocats, 31/10/2024 – Formal notice to Bernard Grua on behalf of Vladimir Martus regarding the Russian vessel Shtandart circumventing EU sanctions ↩︎
  10. Vladimir Martus, 23/11/2024 – Police report (main courante) against Bernard Grua, spokesperson of the collective “No Shtandart in Europe » (Fr) ↩︎
  11. Vladimir Martus, 09/12/2024 – Criminal complaint against Bernard Grua, spokesperson of the collective “No Shtandart in Europe » (Fr) ↩︎
  12. Clerc Avocats, 18/03/2025 – Letter to Gabriel Attal, former Prime Minister, President of the France-Ukraine Friendship Group at the National Assembly (Fr) ↩︎
  13. Vladimir Martus, 15/05/2025 – Open letter to the French Maritime Administration ↩︎
  14. Ria Novosti, 14/07/2024 – The frigate Shtandart has become the target of pro-Ukrainian activists in the EU (Ru) ↩︎
  15. No Shtandart Google Site – Page “The Shtandart, Russian propaganda outlets and media » (Ru) ↩︎
  16. No Shtandart in Europe, 10/08/2025 – SHTANDART CASE: Mor Glaz’s Role in Russia’s Sanctions Evasion ↩︎
  17. Mor Glaz dossier in Russian media – «Штандарт», Жан-Поль Елькан и Mor Glaz (Ru) ↩︎
  18. No Shtandart In Europe, 15/05/2023 – Shtandart: response to the SLAPP action by Me Thierry Clerc, lawyer of Gérard d’Aboville and the “Semaine du Golfe” (Fr) ↩︎
  19. European Council, 24/06/2024 – CFSP Declaration No. 2024/1744 ↩︎
  20. Prefect of Finistère, 07/07/2024 – Prefectural Decree banning the Russian vessel Shtandart from accessing ports of the department (Fr) ↩︎
  21. Administrative Court of Rennes, 11/07/2024 – Order of the Administrative Court of Rennes rejecting the suspension request by the Shtandart against the Prefectural Decree (Fr) ↩︎
  22. European Commission, 12/07/2024 – Letter to Bernard Grua ↩︎
  23. No Shtandart In Europe, 14/11/2024 – Response to Me Thierry Clerc regarding the attempted SLAPP action of the Russian vessel Shtandart ↩︎
  24. Council of State, 18/11/2024 – Decision rejecting the appeal by the Shtandart against the order of the Administrative Court of Rennes ↩︎
  25. Wikipedia – Streisand effect ↩︎
  26. X (formerly Twitter) – Posts “Thierry Clerc” ↩︎
  27. X (formerly Twitter) – Posts “Clerc Avocats” ↩︎
  28. No Shtandart Google Site – Page “Thierry Clerc” ↩︎
  29. Bernard Grua Blog – Page “Thierry Clerc” ↩︎
  30. No Shtandart in Europe, 15/01/2025 – Request for clarification regarding the SLAPP action initiated by Russian national Vladimir Martus, in violation of EU port sanctions (Fr) ↩︎
  31. No Shtandart in Europe, 24/03/2025 – Letter to Mr. Gabriel Attal regarding the misleading rhetoric of Me Thierry Clerc, lawyer of the Russian vessel Shtandart, in breach of EU sanctions ↩︎
  32. No Shtandart in Europe, 28/03/2025 – Alleged referral to the Bar Council regarding the circumvention of EU sanctions by the Russian vessel Shtandart (Fr) ↩︎
  33. No Shtandart in Europe, 29/03/2025 – How do lawyer Thierry Clerc and Vladimir Martus hope to silence the whistleblower collective “No Shtandart in Europe”? (Fr) ↩︎
  34. No Shtandart in Europe, 31/03/2025 – Request for hearing before the Public Prosecutor regarding the complaint filed by Russian national Vladimir Martus (Fr) ↩︎
  35. No Shtandart in Europe, 04/04/2025 – Administrative Court of Rennes: Reply brief by Me Isabelle Enard-Bazire and Me Thierry Clerc, annotated by Bernard Grua (Fr) ↩︎
  36. No Shtandart in Europe, 16/04/2025 – Documented rebuttal and fact-checking of the reply brief of the Russian vessel Shtandart before the Administrative Court of Rennes, challenging the Prefect of Finistère (Fr) ↩︎
  37. Ouest-France, 23/05/2025 – INVESTIGATION. The Russian vessel Shtandart wages Putin’s war right into the Gulf of Morbihan ↩︎
  38. Medium – Articles related to the Shtandart ↩︎
  39. Google Sites – Information platform on the Shtandart ↩︎
  40. Bernard Grua Blog – Articles on the Shtandart ↩︎
  41. Wikipedia – SLAPP lawsuit ↩︎
  42. European Parliament and Council, 11/04/2024 – Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) ↩︎
  43. European Parliament, 27/06/2023 – EU protection against lawsuits aiming to silence critical voices (anti-SLAPP) ↩︎
  44. L’Express, 13/05/2025 – EXCLUSIVE. Putin’s 13 attacks in France: the alarming intelligence report (Fr) ↩︎
  45. European Parliament and Council, 11/04/2024 – Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) ↩︎

On the same topic

Publié par Bernard Grua

Graduated from Paris "Institut d'Etudes Politiques", financial auditor, photographer, founder and spokesperson of the worldwide movement which opposed to the delivery of Mitral invasion vessels to Putin's Russia, contributor to French and foreign media for culture, heritage and geopolitics.

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