Response to Thierry Clerc, lawyer, regarding the attempted SLAPP procedure from Russian ship Shtandart

Response to Thierry Clerc, the lawyer in charge of the SLAPP suit brought by the Russian Vladimir Martus, the hidden owner of the vessel #Shtandart, which has been, since 16 April 2022, in breach of the European Union’s restrictive measures taken after the Bucha massacres.

Subject: Response to the legal threats made by Vladimir Martus, a Russian in breach of European sanctions

La Rochelle, November 14, 2024

Dear Mr Thierry Clerc,

As you already know, for almost two and a half years now our international whistleblowing collective, ‘No Shtandart In Europe’, has been documenting the fraud of the Russian vessel Shtandart in the 5th round of sanctions taken following the Bucha massacres, the provisions of which were formalised in Article 3ea of EU Regulation No 833/2014. The European Council ruled that aiding and abetting the violation of restrictive measures is a criminal offence. Following our representations to the European Commission, the Council also formally reiterated that the Russian vessel Shtandart, a replica of a historic ship, falls within the scope of EU port bans, whether it is flying its national flag or a flag of convenience.

You are also aware that for almost two and a half years we have been under fire from unfounded complaints, slander, invective, threats and blackmail, including through the press, from individuals and organisations involved in this fraud. Under duress, they demand silence about their turpitude. To this, it must be added the harassment of a pro-Putin far right, of useful idiots and of followers of Vladimir Martus, the captain and the de facto, if not de jure, owner of the Russian ship Shtandart. The ship now flies the flag of the Cook Islands. As spokesman for the collective, I am being particularly targeted. Already, on 15 May 2023, for the same purpose, you were mandated against me by the president of ‘La Semaine du Golfe du Morbihan’ (Morbihan Gulf Week), who wanted us to give up our demonstration on the 18th of the same month of May 2023 and that we hide information that were embarrassing to him. Since then, the Management of this festival has scuttled itself with a bang (Fr). We are tempted to see a causal link here.

On 31 October 2024, while I was on an assignment in Ukraine, you sent me another letter, under number 1A21569390173, this time written at the request of Vladimir Martus. Here are the links to this letter (Fr), also available as an attachment, and to its appendices (Fr). It is no longer just a question of calming the bitterness of an old notable from Morbihan County. The attack is far more serious, with potentially far-reaching consequences. Unfortunately, it has to be said that this move is part of an unpatriotic campaign to benefit foreign interests hostile to our country and our European institutions.

I will review, in detail, the arguments. I will show that the « legal » presentation cannot claim, according to our verifications, to give a true picture of European law. Secondly, I think I can enlighten you on the syrupy fiction of the Shtandart, which we are tired of constantly debunking and which Vladimir Martus is trying to turn you into yet another propagandist for. Finally, I don’t think it’s all that difficult to show that the threats the Russian is hoping to get you to make are part of the gag procedure and a form of radical trollism that we’ve learned to deal with in the 10 years we’ve been opposing Putin’s system and his methods of interference in France. These mindless stompings are an admission of powerlessness. You will therefore understand that we take them as encouragement to continue our efforts to enforce the rule of law and European regulations and to denounce the accomplices of this extravagant case, wherever they might be.

I would like to point out that I am being questioned by the Russian Vladimir Martus, as spokesman for the ‘No Shtandart In Europe’ collective, which is being attacked in this way. So this is not private correspondence. Consequently, in the interests of transparency and information, our exchanges will be public. They will also be translated into English and Ukrainian for wider distribution. This response is available online at: https://bit.ly/shtandart-thierry-clerc-en.

Readers are invited to contribute to the discussion by commenting at the bottom of this article.

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1. IN TERMS OF EUROPEAN LAW

2. ON THE REMARKS CONCERNING VLADIMIR MARTUS

3. SHTANDART IS A REGISTERED TRADEMARK

Addendum

• Letter fom Thierry Clerc
• French Council of State ruling rejecting Shtandart’s appeal against the order of the Rennes administrative court, 18/11/2024
• Who is Mr Thierry Clerc, the lawyer of Russian Vladimir Martus, a violator of European sanctions?
• « Shtandart» brand
  • Information attached to Thierry Clerc’s letter
  • Data from French National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI)
• Twitter

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1. IN TERMS OF EUROPEAN LAW

1.1. Wrong premise

On 24 June 2024, the European regulation on port bans would have ‘added’ the Shtandart to the scope of sanctions. This is the basis of Vladimir Martus’s ‘demonstration’. But this premise is wrong. In fact, Shtandart has been banned from European ports since 16 April 2022 by Article 3ea of EU Regulation 833/2014.

1. It shall be prohibited to provide access, after 16 April 2022, to ports and, after 29 July 2022, to locks in the territory of the Union to ANY vessel registered under the flag of Russia, and for such vessels to access ports and locks, with the exception of access to locks for the purpose of leaving the territory of the Union.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/2024-09-13

For while the Shtandart escapes, for strange reasons, the SOLAS Convention, it is covered by a number of other international maritime conventions mentioned in paragraph 3(a) of Article 3ea of EU Regulation 833/2014. Nor does it fall within the scope of the derogations provided for in paragraphs 5, 5a and 5b of the said article. This has been understood by all the EU countries which, with the exception of France, prohibit its access to their ports. This was the response given by the maritime authorities in Vigo, Spain, to Vladimir Martus and the to « Fundación Traslatio » on 22 July 2022, when the Shtandart attempted to take part in the « Ruta Iacobus Maris ». As a reminder, after a number of infringements, the Shtandart is not only banned from Spanish ports, but has also been banned from Spanish territorial waters since July 2024 (Sp). We would like to draw your attention to the fact that, nevertheless, Vladimir Martus is not attacking the Spanish authorities, but the French and European authorities. This is a point that would require a lengthy separate essay. We can, however, discuss it together if you wish.

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1.2 Confirmed ban

For almost two and a half years, we have been constantly reminding the authorities and organisers of maritime events of this port ban. All the too few journalists who have taken the trouble to read the European regulations have come to the same conclusion:

• El Faro de Vigo, 10/07/2022 – Russian frigate fights off sanctions and heads for Vigo; (Sp).
• La Croix, 18/03/2023 – In Morbihan county, a collective opposes the arrival of a Russian ship. (Fr)
• Ouest-France, 23/08/2024 – Does the Russian ship ‘Shtandart’ have the right to enter French ports? (Fr)
• Hitwest, La Rochelle, 05/09/2023 – Should the Russian ship ‘Shtandart’ be allowed to enter French ports? (Fr)
• Ouest-France and MP Jean-Charles Larsonneur, 03/06/2024 – The Russian ship Shtandart in Brest? « France is not applying the European rule ». (Fr)

The same was true for David Samzun, Mayor of Saint-Nazaire (Fr), who was presented with a fait accompli on 16 August 2023.

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1.3. Informal free rides

Despite official bans, in France the Shtandart has long benefited from informal privileges thanks to a spurious rewriting of the European regulation by anonymous accomplices within the Direction Nationale du Renseignement et des Enquêtes Douanières [National Customs Intelligence and Investigation Directorate](Fr), then by specious communications, and even pressure from the Secretary General for the Sea (Fr), Didier Lallement, ex-Prefect of the Paris Police, who had no mandate to do so according to the instruction ‘National competent authorities for the implementation of EU restrictive measures (sanctions)’. Today, the sanctions are being circumvented in La Rochelle with the benevolence of Prefect Brice Blondel. And all this without ever publicly producing a single official authorisation. In May 2023, you sent us some astonishing documents. They are all incriminating testimonies for which we thank you warmly. France is not Putin’s Russia. In a constitutional state such as ours, governed by the rule of law, it is not the executive power that writes the law. It is only responsible for applying it. It would be good if someone, if they can, tried to explain this to the Russian Vladimir Martus.

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1.4. Call to order by the European Council

Following our interventions, in order to cut short the arguments put forward in connection with the French fraud, on 24 June 2024 the European Council clarified what is meant by ‘vessel’. Article 3ea(3)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 states that

from : (a ‘vessel’ means) « (a) a ship falling within the scope of the relevant international conventions»
became: « (a) a ship falling within the scope of the relevant international conventions, including replicas of historical ships;»

Note the ‘including’. This is a clarification of the regulation and not, as claimed, an ‘amendment…adding replicas of historic ships to the list of ships’. In fact, the term ‘clarification’ is used in the letter we received from the European Commission on 12 July 2024. It was a clear call to order to the French authorities, and in particular to the Secretary General for the Sea and the prefects. The Commission agrees with us and with the few journalists who worked professionally. It logically validates the position of the mayor of Saint-Nazaire, David Samzun, and the MP Jean-Charles Larsonneur.

RELEX-SANCTIONS@ec.europa.eu
12 Jul 2024 12:11
Mr Grua,
We acknowledge receipt of your letters of 9 March, 10 April and 28 June 2024 concerning the vessel « Shtandart ».
In the 14th round of 24 June 2024 (Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014), the scope of the ban on access to ports has been clarified to explicitly cover replicas of historic ships. Any replica historic ship flying the Russian flag or having flown the Russian flag before 24 February 2022 may not call at a port of a Member State.
The implementation and application of EU sanctions are the responsibility of the Member States. The Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, supervises the implementation and application of the sanctions by the Member States and supports them in this task.
Please note that this answer represents the technical point of view of the Commission services. Only the Court of Justice of the EU has jurisdiction to interpret EU law.
Yours sincerely,
European Commission
DG for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (FISMA)
EU Sanctions Webpage: https://commission europa.eu/sanctions
EU Sanctions Map: https://sanctionsmap.eu

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1.5. Embarrassing ‘article 4ha’.

We would like to thank you for the texts you were kind enough to enclose with your letter. We have read them again very carefully. We note that Vladimir Martus wants to create confusion between the European regulation of the 5th round, general port sanctions, which is the subject of a clarification or precision in the 14th round, and a specific addition from the 14th round concerning new in-depth sectoral bans.

• There are 39 chapters in the introduction to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1744 of 24 June 2024. They cover a wide range of subjects: LNG, finance, diamonds, etc. It is not surprising that the points relating to ships are grouped together in the same chapter, namely (13). This chapter begins by presenting the points relating to Article 4x (addition of new sectoral bans). It, subsequently, presents the elements relating to Article 4ha (clarification of the general port ban). The two subjects are different and separated by ‘Furthermore’. Subsequently, these two subjects are presented again in the two different articles set out above.

• The list of 27 vessels banned in Annex XVI of CFSP 2024/1744 applies to Article 4x, which does not concern the Shtandart. It is not surprising that this vessel is not included in such an inventory . Obviously, this list does not apply to Article 4ha, which does concern the Shtandart.

• In the updated European Regulation No 833/2014, Article 4ha of CFSP Decision 2024/1744 is inserted as a clarification to Article 3ea, which bans Shtandart in EU ports from 16 April 2022. Article 4x of CFSP Decision 2024/1744 is added as Article 3s of the Regulation. The inventory of the 27 vessels banned as a result of the specific sanctions and set out in Annex XVI to CFSP Decision 2024/1744 is included in the introduction to Article 3s of the Regulation as Annex XLII. The updated Article 3ea makes no reference to it.

• Once this clarification has been made, the developments and texts relating to alleged « retroactivity «  become irrelevant, as explained below.

Such a confusion, constructed by Vladimir Martus, is like trying to mix oil with vinegar. It also contradicts Article 3ea(3)(b) and (c) of EU Regulation 833/2014. These two subparagraphs continue to specify what is meant by ‘vessel’.

b) a yacht, of 15 metres in length or more, which does not carry cargo and carrying no more than 12 passengers; or
c) recreational craft or personal watercraft as defined in Directive 2013/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/2024-09-13

How can it be considered that the vessels banned under subparagraphs b) and c) are ‘vessels that contribute to Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine… (or) vessels involved in the transport of goods that generate revenue to finance Russia’s war’? But since the Shtandart’s lobbyists like to talk about lists of banned ships, you and we can give them the complete list of 4,197 banned ships sent to the French port authorities on 26 June 2024 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The Shtandart is blacklisted on line no.3227.

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1.6. Flag of convenience

Paragraph 2 of Article 3ea of EU Regulation N°833/2014 is clear:

2. Paragraph 1 (prohibition) shall apply to vessels that have changed their Russian flag or their registration, to the flag or register of any other State after 24 February 2022.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/2024-09-13

• Vladimir Martus claims that, as the Shtandart was reflagged to the Cook Islands on 6 June 2024, it could not be affected by sanctions on Russian-flagged vessels. But there are no new sanctions concerning the Shtandart. It is not an ‘addition’. This has already been explained. It is a ‘clarification’ as the European Commission puts it, or a ‘precision’ as the European Council indicates.
• In any case, even if we accept the allegation of ‘extension’, the argument of ‘retroactivity’ does not hold water. You will recall that this has already been made clear to you personally by the order of the interim relief judge at the Rennes Administrative Court (Fr), dated 11 July 2024, which dismissed Vladimir Martus’s application. And this, we quote you, despite ‘very precise arguments (which) were developed against the prefectoral decrees of Finistère on 7 July 2024 and La Manche on 13 August 2024.’

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1.7 Without any doubt

Vladimir Martus, an individual who claims to be a pirate (Ru), confident in his protection at the highest level, in Russia and elsewhere, and in his hold on the media, creates his own noisy personal “fog of war”.

• He launches a series of lawsuits, financed, as far as we know… by appeals to the public’s generosity and naiveté. Dmitry Atlashkin could tell you more about their Homeric common pugilism, which started in 2007 and lasted 13 years. But these filings by a Russian neither write nor tell French and European law. We might add that the Russian who claims to dictate law to the French, in their own country, is the same one who declared that the Finistère prefect’s decree was illegal, a statement he was disavowed of by the Rennes court, who said he would force his way into the large military port of Ponant (Fr), base of the « Force Océanique Stratégique » (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines), and who was prevented from entering the roadstead of Brest (Rade de Brest) by a patrol boat dispatched by the Commander-in-Chief for the Atlantic.
• For those who don’t fit into the alternative reality promoted by the Shtandart networks, these complaints and proposed appeals do not raise any “serious doubt”. As citizens respectful of the rule of law and in touch with the real world, it is impossible for us to attach any importance to these Russian jeremiads, which carry no weight in the face of an official ban ratified by all 27 EU member states. A ban that has been specified and clarified by European institutions, then officially ratified by prefectoral decrees and the court.
• Such maneuvers only raise a “serious doubt” in the minds of those who want to believe it, or in the mouths of those with a vested interest. Your valuable presentation shows the vacuity of the “legal arguments” of Vladimir Martus and his networks of influence. We are grateful for this confirmation. As Vladimir Martus wishes, we shall make good use of it.

Addendum:

On Thursday (11/07/2024), the Administrative Court of Rennes rejected the request for summary proceedings filed by the Russian vessel Shtandart… According to the order, which AFP was able to consult, none of the arguments put forward “are such as to create a serious doubt as to the legality of the prefectoral decree of July 7, 2024 in dispute”.

Marine et océans, 11/07/2024
https://marine-oceans.com/actualites/la-justice-maintient-linterdiction-au-navire-russe-shtandart-daccoster-a-brest/

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1.8. Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)

We can only encourage Russian Vladimir Martus to take legal action against the European regulation of June 24, 2024, the French prefectoral decrees and the administrative court ruling. While he loses out personally, he will please his government, which is very hostile to sanctions and eager to create discord, even chaos, in countries it cites as enemies. His previous French tricks, which the Quimper prefecture cautiously tried to cover up by speaking of “extension” to the Rennes court, will have no effect on a European judge. He will revert to the original text, applicable since April 16, 2022. This will open the door to condemnation of the Shtandart’s numerous illegal stopovers, the series of which began in Port-de-Bouc in April 2022.

Let’s move on to Vladimir Martus’ marshmallow, and to the threats he’s trying to hire you for.

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UPDATE : On November 18, 2024, the Conseil d’Etat (State Council), France’s highest court of administrative justice, rejected the appeal lodged by Martus TV GmbH, Maria Martus and Vladimir Martus against the order issued by the Administrative Court of Rennes on July 11, 2024.

They were therefore unable to overturn the prefectoral decree of July 7, 2024 banning Shtandart from Finistère ports.

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2. ON THE REMARKS CONCERNING VLADIMIR MARTUS

The following language elements are those that Vladimir Martus would like to impose, externally, regarding himself and regarding the Shtandart, as he practices on board. None of them can amount to a derogation from port sanctions, namely Article 3ea of EU Regulation No. 833/2014, nor a fortiori, justify their repeated violation since April 16, 2022. But we’ll stop there, as they very often serve as a smokescreen and diversion from the substantive issues both on the part of the Russian and his many thurifers and networks of influence. On the other hand, it’s useful to understand what’s behind the window-dressing of a highly organized and constantly evolving opacity.

2.1. Ukrainian father

Vladimir Martus claims that his mother was Russian and his father Ukrainian (Addendum: on July 11, 2024, Thierry Clerc told the court in Rennes that it was Vladimir Martus’s mother and not his father who was Ukrainian). It’s just a lot of hot air. This assertion, promoted since March 2022, has no connection with the application of the 5th round of the sanctions, but contributes to the smokescreen set up around the Shtandart. Has Vyacheslav Alekseevich Martus’s nationality been verified on his birth certificate? It’s doubtful. But if this information were, improbably, accurate, it would not make his son, the Russian Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Martus, a Ukrainian, or even a Russian with a Ukrainian bent. He’s far from it. Here are a few examples:

• Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Martus was born in 1966, grew up and studied in St. Petersburg (then Leningrad).
• The construction of the replica of the Petrovian Shtandart was supported by the municipality of St. Petersburg, of which Anatoli Sobchak was mayor. His close advisor was Vladimir Putin.
• Peter the Great, to whom Vladimir Martus likes to refer and whose filiation Vladimir Putin claims to “legitimize” his invasion, is a figure hated by the Ukrainians he annexed. The same goes for Catherine II (see Çeşme, below), who reduced the Cossacks from free men to serfs, i.e. slaves. Her monument was dismantled in Odessa, in 2022, on these grounds.
• People close to Vladimir Martus have links with the Russian militias in the Donbass, long before February 2022. Russian-speaking members of our collective are currently formalizing their research on these individuals. We can share the results with you if you wish.
• Vladimir Martus’s 2018 confessions to Natalya Aryaeva (Ru) show his Russism if not his Russian nationalism. “The aim of the project (Shtandart) is to educate young people… to respect the history of their homeland”. “We sail and will always sail under the Russian flag.” “Participation in such a project is a great way to educate young people in patriotism. Real patriotism.” “The Standard is history incarnate – a bridge between the glorious past of Peter the Great’s time and the present.” “I’m trying to realize on board the ideal I was taught in communism”. “I’d really like to keep that spirit on the Shtandart, taking all the best from the Soviet Union”. In other words, the Shtandart is a Russification machine. This can be seen, for example, among the French dropouts who have taken passage on board, once they have recited the first two or three answers of convenience, prescribed for them by their captain and director of conscience. The July 16, 2024 meeting in Brest (Fr) was a sad illustration of this. It was in line with the false testimony communicated by crew man Arthur Gazzarin (Fr) to the newspaper “Libération”, in January 2023.
• On August 4, 2016, Vladimir Martus celebrated (Ru) the fact that Russian sailors were taking possession of the “Khersones”, a tall ship stolen from Ukraine during the annexation of Crimea. No Ukrainian or Ukrainian supporter was happy about it.
• Vladimir Martus’s Facebook page shows that he is only concerned by the consequences of the war in Russia, but is indifferent to the Ukrainian tragedy (Fr) caused by the inconceivable barbarity of his compatriots.
• In May 2024, Vladimir Martus took part in the production of a video echoing the Kremlin’s doxa. Ukrainian whistle-blowers and the author of these lines are equated with extremists and Nazis. We’re not far from the arguments promoting Putin’s genocidal “denazification”. No Ukrainian would use such language against supporters of Ukraine. Yet the video was shared, along with a tribute to its author, on the “Shtandart Project” Facebook page.
• As journalists have reported, Vladimir Martus uses, among other terms, the adjective “Russophobe” about me, in order to discredit me. Remember that a phobia is a mental disorder. Russophobe is a sophism popularized by Russian propaganda organs from 2014 onwards on the occasion of the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in the Donbass. See, “@DFRLab#PutinAtWar: How Russia Weaponized ‘Russophobia’” In this case, the accusation of Russophobia is inane, as my publications on « Russia Beyond », a Russian state media, show. In any case, no Ukrainian would use this term in the form of blame. Mentioning this preposterous accusation at last month’s conferences in Ukraine provoked outright hilarity and even compliments.

Whatever his ancestry, real or fictional, an abyss separates Vladimir Martus from Ukraine and Ukrainians.

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2.2. Close to Russian power

Vladimir Martus claims he no longer has any links with Russia. But this is not true.

• In October 2021, Vladimir Martus led a diplomatic mission to the Aegean Sea for the Russian Geographical Society, headed by Sergei Shoigu and whose board of directors is chaired by Vladimir Putin. The expedition commemorating the naval victory at Çeşme under Catherine II was paid for by the Russian Presidential Administration’s Grant Fund.
• Vladimir Martus returned to St. Petersburg between early January and mid-February 2022 (Ru). He left a few days before the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, contrary to his claims, the Shtandart can perfectly well return to Russia (Ru). But his mission and interests, including financial ones, are clearly in France.
• On July 16, 2024, Vladimir Martus made a public proclamation concerning the Finistère prefect’s decree: “The only ones to benefit from this decision: the Kremlin and Mr. Putin”(Fr). Since then, he has been working to give substance to this summons. Vladimir Martus is in frequent contact with Russian propaganda agencies. This is not a warning to be taken lightly. You can see it in the hundreds of Russian articles published since mid-July 2024. Run a search under “Штандарт  » (Ru). These publications set up Vladimir Martus as a Russian national hero in the fight against European sanctions. They also made a star of Jean-Paul Hellequin (Жан-Пол Элькан) of the “Mor Glaz” association. Other Frenchmen supporting Vladimir Martus, against European regulations, could be awarded this damaging Russian distinction. There are some medals that may flatter a retired Cégétiste (a member of CGT, a communist French trade union), but which it’s better to shun when you’re a professional with a high profile, especially at the moment. Additionnally, these media, even when informed of its flag of convenience, continue to refer to the Shtandart as “the Russian ship”. For them, moreover, the ship belongs to Vladimir Martus. His daughter, Maria, is not mentioned. More on that later. So much for those who’ve been fooled by his tricks.
• We could also ask about the profiles of the Russian crew members or even those of some dubious passengers. There seems to be a lot to discover on this subject. This explains the particular attention paid by the Préfet Maritime – Commander in Chief for the Atlantic, to onboard personnel, as Vladimir Martus, was informed on August 16, 2024, by the officer of the watch at Cross Etel. As such, the man who was Vladimir Martus’s henchman in La Rochelle for 7 years seems to have a lot to say now that he has entered into rebellion against his principal because, he says, of commissions that were agreed but not received. We leave it to others to question this character, in whom we have no confidence.

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2.3. Nominee

Vladimir Martus points out that the Shtandart is now owned by a nominee, his daughter Maria Martus. This is unnecessary and risky.

• Has the title deed been checked? Is it authentic? If so, how? The Shtandart belonged, still belongs (?), to the Ассоциация “Проект Штандарт” (Assotsiatsiya “Proyekt Shtandart”) (Ru), domiciled in St. Petersburg, in which Vladimir Martus held (holds?) just over 60% of the shares. What happened to Lidia Plekhanova, Sergei Neustupov, Andrei Akhmatov and Sergei Alexeev, the other four partners? Is there a dispute here too? What’s more, as we’ll see later, the “Shtandart” trademark belongs to Vladimir Martus, who claims to control everything that’s done, said and written about the ship. What sense could the straw owner possibly have? These are questions a lawyer might ask himself.
• However, if the statement is correct, the Shtandart is indeed a private yacht operated by the trading company Martus TV GmbH, a limited liability company under German law, controlled by Vladimir Martus.
• What then of the fact that the Shtandart is regularly presented as an associative vessel to “explain” its “volunteer” crew, its non-compliance with sanctions and its regular appeals to the public’s generosity? This could be of interest to the tax authorities, as well as to the General Directorate for Competition Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF), and even the Labor Inspectorate and the Organizations for the Collection of Social Security and Family Benefit Contributions (URSSAF).
• We might add that the Shtandart, a private yacht, would, in addition, be affected by paragraph 3(b) of article 3ea of EU regulation no. 833/2014.
• In any case, the use of the term “navire associatif” (associative vessel) was already an abuse. The equivalent of the French concept of association is not “ассоциация” (assotsiatsiya) but “фонд” (fond), namely foundation.
• In any case, Article 3ea of EU Regulation No. 833/2014 covers ANY vessel registered under the Russian flag (as of 24/02/2022). Ownership conditions and owner(s) are therefore irrelevant.

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2.4. German resident?

Vladimir Martus claims to reside in Germany when he is not on board the boat. Why does he make this claim and how can he justify it?

• To lend credence to this attempt at diversion, we are awaiting evidence from him that Vladimir Martus actually resided in Germany during the years 2022, 2023 and 2024. In the course of our investigations, we have found no such evidence.
• In fact, Vladimir Martus has been residing on board the Shtandart in the trawler basin of La Rochelle, where the ship is openly domiciled, since June 8, 2022, in violation of European sanctions. This address is confirmed on its Google account, on its Facebook page and by the La Rochelle tourist office (Fr) .
• As a reminder, the Shtandart’s home port, i.e. its port of registry, was Saint Petersburg, Russia, until June 6, 2024, that it left in 2009. Since June 6, 2024, it has been Avarua, Cook Islands, where it has never shown its bow.

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2.5. Passengers known as “trainees ».

Vladimir martus makes you say that his ship is engaged in a “training activity”. This is questionable and irrelevant.

• Martus TV GmbH charges for the Shtandart’s commercial services at maritime festivals, where it serves as a backdrop and accommodates guests in a form of Airbnb. When commuting between events, the Shtandart embarks paying passengers whom it calls ‘trainees’ to avoid the safety obligations inherent in the SOLAS Convention. You can visit its website to see what it offers.
• We don’t know why Vladimir Martus adds ‘(that) he does not support Russia’s war in Ukraine’. It’s a truism, because this war is damaging his business. What’s more, no Russian doing business in Western Europe can be heard proclaiming that he is in favour of the war. That would be suicidal. They all try, even those who are not under sanctions, to paint their business in blue and yellow. It sells better. Vladimir Martus has also desecrated the Ukrainian flag on numerous occasions (Fr) for marketing purposes. It took the intervention of the President of the Union of Ukrainians in France to get the departmental prefects to put an end to this morbid maskirovka.
• The fact remains that, even sticking strictly to what Vladimir Martus says, there is nothing here worth a derogation from Article 3ea of EU Regulation No 833/2014 relating to ANY vessel registered under the Russian flag (as at 24/02/2022) whatever its use.

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2.6. Own « Values »?

Your letter states that Vladimir Martus instructs you to “ask me to stop any statements that do not respect his own values”. I’m sorry, he’s laughing at all of us, including you.

• What are the “values” of Vladimir Martus, a businessman close to the Russian government, a torch-bearer for Russian imperialism, a fake opponent, a fake political exile, an adept of argumentum ad personam to evade fundamental questions, a violator of European legislation, etc.? We know that this case, where confusion is deliberately promoted, is complex. Please find out more about this character. It would take too long here, but we can illustrate each of these “values” separately, and many others, with verifiable information and testimonials, if you wish.
• Vladimir Martus can keep such “values” to himself. They are not, thank God, those of our collective.

We will continue to formulate our statements in accordance with actual values, which are those of the Republic, the democracy and the rule of law. It is clear that they do not belong in the repertoire of Vladimir Martus, of Russian Empire, of Soviet Union or of the criminal regime in whose de facto service he finds himself. We won’t stop until the Shtandart is effectively banned from docking in European ports. Then it will be time to deal with the French who built, allowed or even encouraged its fraud. They are many, but you already know some of them, as presented above and according to other letters received recently.

Now, let’s move on to the explicit threats.

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3. SHTANDART IS A REGISTERED TRADEMARK

3.1. Letter of marque

Shtandart is a trademark registered with the French National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) on July 9, 2024 by the German trading company Martus TV GmbH, controlled by Vladimir Martus. It became definitive on October 2, 2024.

• Disregarding the anteriority, in the name of this registration, Vladimir Martus claims to prohibit us from using the name of our collective, which has been called “No Shtandart In Europe” since July 2022. Retroactivity, see above, seems to be a variable geometry in this case. In any case, article L713-2 of the French Intellectual Property Code, invoked here, is an incongruous copy-paste for the purposes of intimidation. Once again, it looks like an oil and vinegar mix. All our publications are available online. Here, too, it’s worth checking everything Vladimir Martus claims. At no time does our collective offer “goods or services identical or similar to those for which the trademark (Shtandart) is registered”. The exact opposite is true.
• There’s another point that may be of interest to legal experts. Through his company, Martus TV GmbH, Vladimir Martus is the owner of the “Shtandart” trademark, whereas, according to him, he is not the owner of the “Shtandart” ship. This is, to say the least, perplexing. Moreover, one wonders what the other four members of “Проект Штандарт” (Shtandart Project) think of this personal appropriation. Consequently, the Shtandart trademark should, in our opinion, have been registered by the Shtandart owner or by “Shtandart Project”. As we can see once again, confusion is a process in constant creation under the orchestration of Russian Vladimir Martus

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3.2. Russian auto-da-fé 

• We’ll pass quickly over Vladimir Martus’s diktats demanding, on pain of reprisals, that we remove all information relating to the Shtandart, including texts that have already been published. This type of auto-da-fé is just one of the Russian practices that oppose freedom of the press and the right to information.

• Dear Mr Thierry Clerc, the great helmsman of the Shtandart is in the wrong country. This is France, not Russia, where krysha, baksheesh, threats and even physical elimination reign. What would your firm be doing on such an unhealthy issue? You’re a Norman and a Frenchman, not a Putin Russian. Stay with us.

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3.3. Pugilism

As for “defamation and insult”. It’s an outrage, alas. We don’t indulge in that sort of thing.

• Vladimir Martus, like one of his main French lobbyists and accomplices, with whom we must be equally cautious, has a habit of attributing to his opponents statements they have not made, the better to slander them, threaten them with legal action and arouse hostility towards them. He invents defamatory statements whenever necessary. Since at least 2007, Vladimir Martus has been building up a victim position when he can no longer force his way through. The history of his pugilism with Dmitry Atlashkin and the staging of his phantasmagorical political persecutions warned us of this. On July 16, 2024, in Brest, we witnessed a breathtaking 45-minute garbage dumping against myself, to which I was given 5 minutes to respond.
• Rather than play the puppet in this pitiful remake of a vaudevillian Stalinist trial, I preferred, in the short time available, to talk about sanctions and counter Jean-Paul Hellequin’s heinous imprecations. It was relevant. No serious journalist familiar with the matter picked up on Vladimir Martus’s nonsense. The latter is now trying to get a lawyer to endorse them. The Russian wants to present, as a personal dispute (Fr), a legal and political problem, even one of national security. This is another deception.
• As far as “defamation” is concerned, all our information is sourced from verifiable documents. They can be consulted at https://bit.ly/No-Shtandart rather than listening to the allegations of the Russian offender or his above-mentioned “protector”. I wish you the best of luck in your profession, without being instrumentalized by a clique of individuals serving the interests of Russian propaganda agencies.

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3.4. Russian gag procedure

• Vladimir Martus is likely to accede to the jurisdictions he is threatening us with for the purposes of omerta concerning the Shtandart affair. Let’s be frank, neither you nor we have any illusions about their outcome if they go ahead. It’s simply a gag procedure for the whistle-blower’s self-censorship. It is a common method used against those who expose Russian interference mechanisms (Fr). We would like to point out that whistleblowers who report violations of European Union law are afforded special protection by the institutions.
• You need to understand which sulphurous camp Vladimir Martus and those who probably commissioned him wish to drag your firm into. I cordially suggest that you exercise circumspection and discernment. When you put your fingers in a case where Russian services are at work, you have to control all your risks. In any case, it’s very difficult to emerge free and unblemished. But we’re ready to help. Educated by ten years of engagement against Putin’s regime, after painful experiences, we have learned to protect ourselves. We might explain this to you, if appropriate.

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We remain at your entire disposal to assist you in exploiting the considerable documentation we have accumulated on this murky and unusual case of Russian interference at the heart of the French state apparatus, as well as its implications at international, national and local level. Please do not hesitate to contact us.

Dear Mr Thierry Clerc, I send you my warmest greetings, and I invite you to join the « No Shtandart In Europe » collective, so that together we can wish good riddance to the ambassadorial boat of deadly Russian imperialism. You will be most welcome.

Bernard Grua

Spokesman for the international whistle-blowing collective “No Shtandart In Europe”.
Lecturer, specializing in Russian propaganda methods
Coordinator of the forum of Ukrainian associations for Western France
Member of the committee that obtained the cancellation of Nantes’ Russian film festival, “From Lviv to the Urals”, in March 2022
Volunteer at the Franco-Ukrainian association “Tryzub” in Nantes
Contributor to Laurent Chamontin’s (Diploweb) geopolitical book “Ukraine et Russie pour comprendre” (Ukraine and Russia to understand), as well as to « Informnapalm », « Ukrinform » and « Ukraine Crisis Media Center ».
Co-founder and former spokesman of the international collective “No Mistrals for Putin”.
Photographer of the Maidan revolution
Former financial auditor
Former naval officer
Graduate of the Paris Institute of Political Studies

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Reference elements:

• Shtandart’s position according to MarineTraffic
• Shtandart’s position according to VesselFinder
• Letter from Mr Clerc to Mr Grua – text, 31/10/2024 (Fr)
• Letter from Mr Clerc to Mr Grua – attachments, 31/10/2024 (Fr)
• Consolidated text: Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, updated 13/09/2024 – See Article 3ea (general port ban), Article 3s (new sectoral bans), Annex XLII (27 vessels banned by Article 3s)
• Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1744 of 24 June 2024 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine – See paragraph (13), Article 4ha (clarification of the general port ban), Article 4x (addition of new sectoral bans),Annex XVI (27 vessels banned by Article 4x)
• Consolidated text: Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, updated 24/07/2024

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Addendum

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Formal notice

Thierry Clerc’s resume

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« Shtandart» brand

As mentioned above, through his company, Martus TV GmbH, Vladimir Martus is the owner of the “Shtandart” trademark, even though he does not, according to him, own the “Shtandart” ship. Is this registration legitimate? One might also wonder what the other four members of “Проект Штандарт” (Shtandart Project) think of this personal appropriation. Consequently, the Shtandart trademark should, in our opinion, have been registered by the Shtandart owner or by “Shtandart Project”.

Through the “Shtandart” trademark, Vladimir Martus claims to control everything that is done, said and written about the ship. Yet at no point in this trademark application is there any mention of the “Shtandart” ship.

Finally, we note that the products on display are commercial, not associative. The opposite of what is claimed by Shtandart’s propagandists.

Information attached to Thierry Clerc’s letter

Data from French National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI)

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